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ABSTRACT 
Three Essays on Corporate Policies 
Olga Kuzmina 
 
Different fields of economics have historically tended to focus on firms’ strategies in 
isolation. In contrast, a lot of the recent work explores how various aspects of firm behavior 
interact with each other. This dissertation contributes to this growing literature by studying the 
interdependences of organizational and financial policies within firms in different contexts. 
The first essay studies the interactions between acquisition decisions of multinationals 
and innovation decisions in the subsidiaries they buy. My coauthors Maria Guadalupe and 
Catherine Thomas, and I use a rich panel dataset of Spanish manufacturing firms and a 
propensity score reweighting estimator to show that multinational firms acquire the most 
productive domestic firms, which, on acquisition, conduct more product and process innovation 
(simultaneously adopting new machines and organizational practices) and adopt foreign 
technologies, leading to higher productivity. The proposed model of endogenous selection and 
innovation in heterogeneous firms can explain both the observed selection patterns and the 
innovation decisions. The innovation upon acquisition is further shown in the data to be 
associated with the increased market scale provided by the parent firm, thereby highlighting the 
role of foreign ownership in increasing the benefits from innovation. This work has potentially 
important implications for the evolution of within-industry productivity distributions. Under the 
mechanism described in the paper, foreign entry may lead to divergence of productivity and 
contribute to the stylized fact of large and persistent productivity differences even within 
narrowly defined industries. 
I further use this rich dataset in my second essay to establish a causal relationship 
between the use of flexible contractual arrangements with labor and capital structure of the firm. 
Using the exogenous inter-temporal variation from government subsidies, I find that hiring more 
temporary workers leads firms to have more debt. Since temporary workers, unlike permanent 
ones, can be fired at a much lower cost during their contract duration, or their contracts may be 
not extended upon expiration, a firm can more easily meet its interest payments and avoid 
bankruptcy when faced with a negative shock. I interpret this result as evidence of flexible 
workforce decreasing operating leverage which, in turn, promotes financial leverage. This study 
therefore contributes to the literature exploring the interactions between firm employment 
decisions and corporate policies by providing evidence for a new channel – the one of flexible 
employment contracts. Given the overwhelming extent of labor reforms in continental Europe in 
recent years that are aimed at offering more job security to workers, it is important to understand 
how such policies would affect firms, and for that it is necessary to model the interdependences 
of firms’ strategies.  
Finally, my third essay looks at a different type of firms – hedge funds. Although, they 
do not produce goods in a strict sense of the word, they provide valuable services to investors by 
smartly investing into large selections of assets. Hedge funds are a very interesting type of 
financial firms to study due to their lower regulation and reporting standards that enable them to 
use some know-how trading strategies and potentially outperform other investors. A part of such 
outperformance can be explained by higher risks born by certain hedge funds, which outlines 
the broad question we explore in this paper with my coauthor Sergiy Gorovyy. We use a 
proprietary dataset obtained from a fund of funds to study the risk premia associated with hedge 
fund transparency, liquidity, complexity, and concentration over the period from April 2006 to 
March 2009. We are able to directly measure these qualitative characteristics by using the 
internal grades that the fund of funds attached to all the funds it invested in, and that represent 
the unique information that cannot be obtained from quantitative data alone. Consistent with 
factor models of risk premium, we find that during the normal times low-transparency, low-
liquidity, low-complexity, and high-concentration funds delivered a return premium, with 
economic magnitudes of 5% to 10% per year, while during bad states of the economy, these 
funds experienced significantly lower returns. We also offer a novel explanation for why highly 
concentrated funds command a risk premium by revealing that it is mostly prevalent among the 
non-transparent funds where investors are unaware about the exact risks they are facing and 
hence cannot diversify them away. The large an significant return premium associated with 
more secretive, less transparent hedge funds has an important policy implication with respect to 
whether hedge funds should be required to disclose the information regarding their trades and 
positions, especially in the light of the recent regulatory changes, including the Dodd-Frank 
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This paper uses a rich panel dataset of Spanish manufacturing firms (1990-2006) and a 
propensity score reweighting estimator to show that multinational firms acquire the most 
productive domestic firms, which, on acquisition, conduct more product and process innovation 
(simultaneously adopting new machines and organizational practices) and adopt foreign 
technologies, leading to higher productivity. We propose a model of endogenous selection and 
innovation in heterogeneous firms that explains both the observed selection patterns and the 
innovation decisions. Further, we show in the data that innovation upon acquisition is associated 
with the increased market scale provided by the parent firm. 
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1 Introduction
The pervasiveness of large and persistent productivity di¤erences across rms within narrowly-
dened industries is a well-established fact that continues to intrigue researchers (see surveys
by Syverson, 2011; Ichniowski and Shaw, 2010). One salient example that has attracted
much attention in several di¤erent elds is that multinational subsidiaries generally out-
perform domestic rms.1 Many have argued that this is because multinationals transfer
superior technologies and organizational practices in the form of new product and process
innovation to their foreign subsidiaries.2 However, since the most prevalent form of multi-
national entry is through acquisition (89 percent of FDI ows in developed countries Barba
Navaretti and Venables, 2004), rather than through greeneld investment, their superior per-
formance could be due to the selection of higher-performing domestic rms. To date, little
is known about the economic determinants of which domestic rms are selected to become
foreign subsidiaries and the extent to which newly acquired subsidiaries increase their pro-
ductivity by innovating introducing technologies that are new to that rm.
In this paper, we use a unique panel dataset to analyze both the selection and innovation
decisions of multinational rms. We propose a new mechanism to explain how these decisions
are jointly determined, highlighting how the market access provided by multinationals cre-
ates incentives for subsidiary innovation and, hence, acquisition. We argue that one cannot
fully understand the relationship between foreign ownership and innovation without explic-
itly recognizing that the incentives for innovation to increase rm productivity and the
incentives for foreign acquisition are inherently interdependent.
The data used in the paper contain information on an array of internal technological
and organizational choices, as well as on foreign ownership and productivity, for approxi-
1Some examples in this literature are Caves (1974), Doms and Jensen (1998), Helpman, Melitz and Yeaple
(2004), Baldwin and Gu (2005), Ramondo (2009), Criscuolo and Martin (2009), and Arnold and Javorcik
(2009).
2Prominent examples include Teece (1977), Caves (1996), Bloom and Van Reenen (2010), and Branstetter,
Fisman and Foley (2006). See the survey of recent empirical literature in Stiebale and Reize (2011).
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mately 2,800 Spanish manufacturing rms between 1990 and 2006.3 The main distinguishing
feature of our data is that we can directly observe di¤erent productivity-enhancing actions
taken within the rm and, hence, do not have to rely on arguably imperfect productivity
estimates to show the impact of acquisition. We are able to study precisely what types of
innovation the acquired rms implement, such as whether they undertake product or process
innovation, assimilate foreign technologies, purchase new machinery or introduce new orga-
nizational practices. We identify our e¤ects by looking at within-rm variation in innovation,
using the panel structure of the dataset. In addition, to control for selection into acquisition
based on time-varying observable characteristics, we implement a propensity score reweight-
ing estimator to estimate the average treatment e¤ect of foreign acquisition on innovation
(Imbens, 2004; Busso, DiNardo and McCrary, 2009).
We rst analyze which domestic rms are more likely to be the target of acquisition,
a largely unexplored question in the international economics literature.4 Empirically, our
data reveal clear evidence of positive selection: Foreign rms buy the most productive rms
within industries i.e., they "cherry-pick."5 Further, we nd that accounting for the positive
selection leads to a labor productivity premium associated with foreign acquisition that is
one third of the cross-sectional estimate. Nonetheless, after accounting for selection, rm
3Spain has a substantial foreign multinationals presence. In 2005, 16.5 percent of the rms surveyed in our
data were foreign-owned, representing 43 percent of total sales in Spanish manufacturing. The OECD reports
that over 95 percent of FDI in Spain in 2005 originated in another OECD country (OECD.StatExtracts).
This is consistent with Markusen (2002) who reports that over 75 percent of all worldwide foreign direct
investment is between developed countries.
4Existing literature in international economics focuses on which parent rms will choose to engage in
FDI (Helpman et al., 2004; Burstein and Monge-Naranjo, 2009), and the determinants of the extent of FDI
activity (Blonigen, 2005). Nocke and Yeaple (2007, 2008) model FDI as the combination of complementary
assets and inputs from rms located across di¤erent countries, and they evaluate empirical predictions about
the parent rms mode of foreign entry greeneld or acquisition as a function of parent rm characteristics.
In contrast, we focus on the empirical question of which domestic rms are acquired.
5Relatedly, Criscuolo and Martin (2009) show that the observed U.S. multinational productivity advantage
is driven mainly by positive selection. In contrast, the corporate nance literature on U.S. M&A activity
has mixed evidence on the nature of selection, which reects varying motives for acquisition. A strand of
this literature asserts that low-performing rms are the most likely to be acquired (Lichtenberg and Siegel,
1987).
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sales increase by 18 percent and labor productivity by 11 percent following acquisition.
Next, we analyze the type of productivity-enhancing innovations acquired rms imple-
ment following acquisition. After controlling for selection using a number of di¤erent strate-
gies (including, among others, rm xed e¤ects and the propensity score reweighting estima-
tor), we nd that acquisition leads to improvements in a rms technology: Acquired rms
are more likely to innovate.6 We also explore a distinction that has long been present in the
literature about di¤erent types of process innovation. Teece (1977) distinguishes between
two types of technology transfer in his seminal study of 26 U.S. multinational subsidiaries:
The rst is "hardware," such as tooling, equipment, and blue prints. The second is the infor-
mation that must be acquired if this hardware is to be used e¤ectively the required methods
of organization.7 Our results indicate that rms do both simultaneously upon acquisition
i.e., they purchase new machines and adopt new methods of organizing production at the
same time, rather than doing either on its own. This is consistent with the nding that it
is optimal for rms to implement new information technology and organizational practices
jointly, identied by a number of authors (Black and Lynch, 2001; Bresnahan, Brynjolfs-
son, and Hitt, 2002; Bartel, Ichniowski and Shaw, 2007), and also shown in the context of
multinationals by Bloom, Sadun and Van Reenen (forthcoming).
The observed positive selection and technology upgrading upon acquisition are consistent
with the predictions of a simple model in which the optimal amount of innovation upon
acquisition depends on the costs and benets of the innovation process and, hence, the
6These ndings are consistent with Arnold and Javorcik (2009) who analyze the e¤ects of foreign owner-
ship on Indonesian rms, controlling for selection. They nd that total investment and investment in new
machinery increase under foreign ownership, along with employment, wages, productivity and sales. They
also show that plants receiving foreign investment use more inputs from abroad and export a larger share
of exports. Stiebale and Reise (2011), in contrast, nd no evidence of an increase in innovation activity in
foreign-acquired German rms.
7In the literature on the market for corporate control, Jensen and Ruback (1980) argue that the potential
synergies prompting e¢ cient mergers could occur through the adoption of more e¢ cient production or
organizational technology. More recently, Bloom and Van Reenen (2010) show that the subsidiaries of
multinational rms exhibit more sophisticated managerial practices than do domestic rms across the U.S.,
Europe and Asia.
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initial characteristics of the acquired subsidiary; in turn, the returns to innovation following
acquisition determine which rms are acquired. We use the model to illustrate how the
selection and innovation decisions are jointly determined. In showing empirical support
for the models predictions, we contribute to the existing literature by providing a new
explanation for why some rms do not invest in technology and organizational upgrades
(based on variation in the costs and benets of innovation for heterogeneous rms), helping
to explain the puzzle of persistent productivity heterogeneity.
In our model, there is a complementarity between the extent of innovation and the
acquired rms initial characteristics reected in its initial productivity. This could arise
for several reasons. For example, a product upgrade is more valuable when the acquired
rm is able to sell more units of the good. Additionally, the benets associated with a
superior production process depend on the skill of the operators, and, more generally, on
existing practices in the acquired subsidiary. We show in the model that the complementarity
between innovation and the acquired rms initial productivity is amplied when the foreign
parent brings lower innovation costs or greater market access.8 A foreign rm could bring
with it lower innovation costs if it has a lower cost of capital (Desai, Foley and Hines, 2004;
Desai, Foley and Forbes, 2008; Manova, Wei and Zhang, 2010) or access to proprietary
technologies (Caves, 1996; Antras, 2003; Antras and Helpman, 2004), but it could also
bring larger benets from innovation. Multinational rms are known to provide acquired
subsidiaries with access to export markets (as shown by Hanson, Mataloni and Slaughter
(2005) for vertical and by Ekholm, Forslid and Markusen (2007) for horizontal foreign direct
investment), thereby increasing rm scale. With either lower innovation costs or greater
market access under foreign ownership, the surplus created by foreign acquisition is increasing
8The complementarity between innovation and market scale is a major theme of the international eco-
nomics literature. For example, the promise of greater sales in export markets creates an incentive for a rm
to invest in productivity-enhancing technologies (Verhoogen, 2008; Bustos, 2011; Lileeva and Treer, 2010;
Aw, Roberts, and Xu, 2011; Atkeson and Burstein, 2010).
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in initial productivity. This explains both positive selection and increased innovation.
We empirically explore the relationship between the greater market scale granted by the
foreign parent and subsidiariesinnovation decisions. We nd that the higher levels of inno-
vation by foreign subsidiaries are, in large part, driven by rms that export through a foreign
parent. Process innovation, product innovation and assimilation of foreign technologies are
each associated with increased market access through the foreign parent. This is consistent
with foreign ownership facilitating access to larger markets and thereby creating incentives
to invest in rm technology. We are able to determine the role of the export channel, as
distinct from export status, because rms in our data are asked how they access export
markets and, specically, whether they export through a foreign parent which could reect
either using the parents distribution channels or selling directly to another entity within the
multinational. Our ndings provide strong evidence that multinational subsidiaries inno-
vate more because they enjoy greater benets from innovation due to their existing market
scale and not just because their innovation costs are lower than domestic rms. The fun-
damental link between foreign ownership in particular, the increase in market access that
comes with foreign ownership and innovation is absent from the existing studies of trade
and innovation, as well as from the literature on organizational structure and productivity.
Note that our empirical results about selection patterns rule out an alternative view
of the process of technology transfer namely, that multinational subsidiaries adopt the
same technology level as the foreign parent independent of their initial productivity. If a
multinational were able to transplant its own productivity to any acquired rm, the value
added through acquisition would be largest for low-productivity rms, leading to negative
selection; that is, multinationals would select to acquire the least productive rms.
Our results about positive selection and increased productivity upon acquisition have
direct implications for the relationship between multinational activity and the evolution
of the productivity distribution, and, hence, allocative e¢ ciency. For rms that become
foreign-owned, the productivity distribution shifts to the right. Since our results suggest
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that multinationals do not purchase a random selection of rms, but are likely to acquire the
initially most productive rms, the results illustrate one channel through which productivity
di¤erences across rms in the economy can be amplied over time.9
Finally, accounting for the links between the innovation and acquisition decisions can
shed light on why foreign multinationals acquire larger rms and on why some rms innovate
more than others. Thus, we provide one possible explanation for the persistent productivity
di¤erences that have long puzzled researchers. Our study suggests that both acquisition
patterns and innovation decisions are determined by the variable costs and benets of tech-
nology transfer. When this is the case, our key insight is that di¤erences in market access
alone, and not just foreign rmsinnovation-cost advantages or their superior technologies,
can explain these phenomena. More generally, the fact that rms within an industry may
have di¤erential access to markets provides a new rationale for why initial di¤erences in
productivity persist, a fundamental question in organizational economics, strategy, and in
other elds (Bloom and Van Reenen, 2007; Syverson, 2011).
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 outlines a simple model illustrating
the relationship between acquisition and investment to frame the empirical analysis. Section
3 describes the data. Section 4 presents the empirical strategy and results related to the
acquisition decision. Section 5 focuses on the innovation decision and explores the role of
the market access mechanism in driving our main results. Section 6 analyzes the e¤ect of
foreign acquisition on productivity, and Section 7 concludes.
2 Acquisition and Innovation Decisions
In this section, we set up a simple industry-level partial equilibrium model to illustrate 1) the
endogenous choices of foreign acquisition and innovation when domestic rms di¤er in initial
9The presence of multinational subsidiaries in an economy is also likely to a¤ect the overall productivity
distribution through other channels for example, by a¤ecting the threshold level of productivity at which
entering rms choose to remain in production. We have not examined these other channels in this paper.
7
productivity, and 2) the complementarities that can emerge among productivity, innovation
and acquisition.10
A. Structure
Consider a model with heterogeneous domestic rms (Melitz, 2003) with a Constant Elas-
ticity of Substitution (CES) demand structure and increasing returns to scale in a setting of
monopolistic competition (Helpman and Krugman, 1985). The initial productivity of rm
i is given by 'i: Forward-looking foreign rms select which domestic rms to acquire, and
all rms choose a level of innovation or other productivity-increasing investment, i. Pro-
duction and prots reect post-innovation productivity levels, i'i, and the rms marginal
cost is given by 1
i'i
.
The price set by each rm is a constant markup over marginal cost, and each variety in an
industry is produced by a single rm. Firm i sets a price 1
i'i
; where  is the parameter in the
CES utility function that denes the elasticity of substitution between varieties  = 1
1  > 1,
assumed to be constant across all markets.11 Each rm sells Ai (i'i)
 units, generating
revenues of Ai 1 (i'i)
 1, where Ai is a measure of market size for the markets relevant













, and work with an increasing transformation of
10In the model, variation in investment levels across rms are optimal choices under complete information,
so that persistent productivity di¤erences are not based on any type of market failure, incomplete information
or X-ine¢ ciency.





 where  2 (0; 1). The
demand for a particular variety of the product sold by a given rm is q(i) = EiPi (
p(i)
Pi
) ; where Ei is total
expenditure in the relevant market for good i on all varieties in the industry, and Pi is a weighted average
of variety prices in the relevant market. The subindex i on Ei and Pi captures the fact that rms can sell
in di¤erent markets. We assume that doing so does not incur transport costs. We dene Ai = EiP
 1
i : See
Dixit and Stiglitz (1977) for further details.
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the innovation level i =  1i from now on. The value, Vi, of each rm operating in the
domestic market (net of the xed production cost) is equal to the variable prot it earns, i,
less the total cost of innovations to increase productivity Ci (i):
(1) Vi (i) = Aii' 1i   Ci (i)
B. The Innovation Decision
We allow the total cost of investment in productivity to be the sum of a xed and a variable
cost of innovation:
Ci (i) = ai + bif (i)
where i measures innovation the improvement in the rms productivity following the
investment. We do not impose any specic functional form on f (i).12
The rm chooses a level of innovation i that maximizes the value of the rm. When
the optimal level of innovation is greater than zero, the rm innovates up to the level where
the marginal benet equals marginal cost:13
(2) Ai' 1i = bif
0 (i )
Equation (2) shows that, ceteris paribus, at an interior solution, innovation, i = 
(Ai; bi; 'i),
is increasing in initial productivity level 'i, greater market size Ai, and decreasing in the cost
12We require only that the technology total cost function Ci (i) has a continuous rst derivative that is
strictly positive whenever i > 1. Note that we do not impose a technological complementarity between
innovation and initial productivity, which could reect an assumption that absorptive capacity (Cohen and
Levinthal, 1990) is increasing in 'i. One way to do this would be to specify b as a decreasing function of 'i.
The current specication can be extended to include this possibility.
13To ensure positive innovation, ai must be su¢ ciently low so that rm value under the optimal investment
level is larger than rm value under no investment. This is true when ai  bi ((   1)f 0 ()  f(). In
the interior optimum  > 1, (since V 0j1 = Ai' 1   bif 0 (1) > 0 as f 0 (1) = 0 where we have imposed
marginal cost continuity).  is guaranteed to be a maximum as long as marginal cost (or, equivalently, f 0)
is a continuous increasing function of . For  to be unique, f 0 should also be strictly increasing for  > 1.
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of technology investment, bi.14 Figure 1 provides an illustration of the positive relationship










is higher, the optimal
level of innovation, i ; is greater for any level of 'i. This illustrates two important economic
mechanisms: the complementarity between innovation and initial productivity, as well as











worthwhile to invest in innovation.
Insert Figure 1 around here
The optimal amount of innovation, , given by equation (2), and, hence, the rms
post-innovation productivity level, depend on the costs and benets of innovation and the
rms initial productivity.16 However, in contrast, a common assumption in the literature
on multinational production is that subsidiaries operate at the same productivity level as
their parent, independent of their initial characteristics.17 This assumption about technology
transfer within a multinational rm could be modeled in our setting by allowing any acquired
rm to nd it optimal to innovate up to the "state of the art" technology level, denoting
14It can be seen from the left hand side of equation (2) that the models predictions are robust to specifying
post-innovation productivity as an additive function of initial productivity and innovation (i + 'i) since
the marginal benet of innovation is also a positive function of 'i in this case. The multiplicative setup
used here is similar to the model in Bustos (2011), where the binary decision about technology investment
is related to the export decision. In our case, rms choose whether to invest, but they also optimize over
the level of investment as a function of innovation costs. Heterogeneous rm productivities could reect
variation in marginal costs or variation in the quality of output produced, allowing more productive rms
to charge higher prices.
15The rst order condition (2) does not separately identify Ai and bi. Access to larger markets and lower
marginal costs of investment in technology have similar e¤ects on the choice of i.
16In practice, this represents a world in which the innovation process is costly, and achieving a higher
productivity level requires greater expenditure. For example, installing a technology with better machinery
or more talented managers is likely to be more expensive; and we might think that there is an increasing
opportunity cost of allocating scarce MNC resources to a particular acquired rm.
17This alternative view of technology transfer is consistent with an assumption made in McGrattan and
Prescott (2010), Burstein and Monge-Naranjo (2009) and Ramondo and Rodriguez-Clare (2009) that all
subsidiaries of a multinational rm operate with the same productivity (up to a discount factor, typically
modeled as iceberg costs).
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that innovation is a decreasing function of initial productivity.18 In this case, the amount of
innovation would, then, be independent of Ai.
C. The Acquisition Decision
We denote V i as the value of the rm, given by equation (1), at the optimal investment level
i for rm i. We now turn to how foreign ownership a¤ects innovation and rm value and,
hence, how foreign rms select which rms to acquire.
We allow foreign acquisition to a¤ect two model parameters. The trade literature has
shown that foreign ownership often provides access to larger markets. If AD measures the
size of the market(s) a domestic rm can access, we allow foreign-acquired rms to have
access to an additional market (denoted A), where access is granted via the parent rms
pre-existing trade contacts and distribution networks in foreign markets. The total market
that a foreign-acquired rm can access is, then, AF = AD + A, where AF  AD. Foreign
ownership may also bring with it lower innovation costs (access to proprietary technologies,
lower costs of nancing, etc.), such that bF  bD or aF  aD. We assume throughout that
0  bF  bD and, for simplicity, that the domestic rm is always at the solution given by
the rst-order condition in equation (2).
Given the parameter values relevant to the rms ownership structure, the optimal level
of innovation under domestic ownership is Di and under foreign ownership is 
F
i (note that
the interests of the parent and the subsidiary are aligned in this model.) Using equation
(1) for rm value under each ownership structure, the incremental value of the rm under
18Once max is included in the model, upgrading the subsidiarys productivity to max would be optimal if
productivity-enhancing innovation incurred only a xed cost i.e., bi = 0:When max gives the upper bound
on the feasible technology, the rst-order condition in equation (2) gives the optimal level of investment









foreign acquisition can be written as:











  bDf  Di 
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V Fi   V Di
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represents the value created by the acquisition. Under the assumptions that
AF  AD, bF  bD and aF  aD and at least one of these inequalities is strictly true
expression (3) is positive.
We assume that the price a foreign rm would pay if it were to acquire rm i, Ri, divides
the value created through the acquisition between the buyers and the sellers, where the
buyer receives a share i 2 [0; 1]. The acquisitions market can be modeled as a game in
which homogeneous foreign parents compete with each other to acquire a subsidiary.19 We
assume that there is a xed cost to a foreign rm of making an acquisition, K, which could
include xed search and transactions costs. Imposing a free-entry zero-prot condition in
the acquisitions market implies that rm i is acquired whenever the incremental value of
the rm under foreign acquisition,
 
V Fi   V Di

, exceeds K, so that there is a minimum
threshold level of 'i at which acquisition becomes e¢ cient (Ravenscraft and Scherer, 1987).
Competition among potential foreign parents means that i adjusts so that each parent
is indi¤erent between acquiring any domestic rm with an initial productivity above this
threshold level.20 The price paid by the acquirer, Ri = V Di + (1  i)
 
V Fi   V Di

, varies
with 'i so that the share of the surplus generated going to the buyer, i
 
V Fi   V Di

, is
always equal to K. That is, the following condition holds for all acquisitions:
(4) i
 
V Fi   V Di

= K
19The model could easily be extended to include heterogeneity among foreign parents. This would not
change the predictions regarding which domestic rms are acquired but would provide additional predictions
related to sorting between parents and subsidiary rms.
20Note that this implies i = 1 for the acquired rm with the lowest initial productivity level, at the
minimum threshold 'i. That is, the surplus generated by the acquisition of the least productive acquired
rm is equal to K in equilibrium.
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Now, we can investigate the relationship between acquisition incentives and initial rm
productivity.
The optimal amount of innovation satises the rst-order condition given in equation
(2). Applying the envelope theorem to the value of the rm under foreign and domestic
control yields d(V
F








> 0. That is, the value created by foreign
acquisition is increasing in initial productivity, and more productive domestic rms are more
likely to be acquired. This result arises from the complementarity between foreign rms
characteristics (larger markets and/or lower costs of innovation), innovation and the acquired
rms productivity: A given innovation is more valuable in more productive rms; and this
value is greater under foreign control due to, for instance, the access to the foreign rms
distribution networks, which means that the innovation can be leveraged in a larger market
and, hence, is more protable.
A very di¤erent scenario emerges under the alternative assumption that multinationals
nd it optimal to transplant their own superior level of technology, max; regardless of who
they buy. Under this assumption, the value of the rm under foreign ownership, V Fi =
AF
 1
max   aF , is independent of its initial characteristics and, in particular, independent
of 'i. This means that there are no sources of complementarity between the characteristics
of the acquired rm and the implemented technology. Since the value of the rm, had it
remained under domestic control, V Di , is an increasing function of 'i, the value added by
acquisition is decreasing in 'i,
d(V Fi  V Di )
d' 1i
=  ADDi < 0, and less productive domestic
rms are more likely to be acquired. That is, the assumption of parent technology transfer
generates the opposite prediction from the assumption that innovation is complementary to
the acquired rms initial productivity.
In our model, the identity of the acquiring rm is irrelevant to the optimal choice of
innovation. We require only the possibility that the parent brings a lower cost of innovation
and/or a larger market than the rm would have had under domestic control. Therefore,
any heterogeneity among parents does not a¤ect the models predictions for innovation and
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acquisition decisions.
Figure 1 illustrates the predicted relationship between i and 'i when innovation is
complementary to the acquired rms initial productivity. It highlights the role played by
selective foreign acquisition. The bold line shows the predicted relationship between initial
productivity and innovation within an industry for a given K. In the gure, rms abovee'1 are acquired and innovate; rms between 'D and e'1 remain domestic and innovate; and
rms below '
D
remain domestic and do not make any investments.
3 Data Description
The results in this paper are based on the Encuesta Sobre Estrategias Empresariales (ESEE),
a panel dataset of Spanish manufacturing rms collected by the Fundación SEPI (a non-
government organization) and the Spanish Ministry of Industry every year since 1990. It is
designed to be representative of the population of Spanish manufacturing rms and includes
approximately 2,800 rms (with the intention of surveying all rms with more than 200
employees and a stratied sample of smaller rms). The response rate in the survey is 80
to 100 percent, and new rms are re-sampled over time to ensure that the panel remains
representative.21
Our data span the years 1990 to 2006. 83.5 percent of the rms are domestic in the rst
year they appear in the data, while 16.5 percent are foreign-owned. We dene a rm as
foreign-owned if it reports that a foreign company owns at least 50 percent of its capital.
91 percent of rms report being either zero- or 100-percent foreign-owned. Markusen (2002)
denes foreign direct investment through acquisition as an investment in which the rm
acquires a substantial controlling interest in a foreign rm. Since 50 percent is a su¢ cient
indicator for foreign control, we have favored this denition of "acquisition" (the results are
21Details on the survey characteristics and data access guidelines can be obtained at
http://www.funep.es/esee/sp/sinfo_que_es.asp.
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robust to specifying other thresholds). We restrict our sample to rms that are not owned
by a foreign company in the rst year they appear in the data, since the model generates
predictions about which domestic rms will be acquired. The data do not record any further
characteristics of the parent rm. However, our dataset is unique in that, in addition to
recording ownership status, it reports a large number of variables that reect each rms
productivity-enhancing innovation activity. The data include variables indicating whether
the rm undertook process and/or product innovation and whether the rm made e¤orts
to assimilate foreign technologies in a given year. These indicator variables reect rm
managersanswers to the survey questions.22
The variables recorded in our data allow us to distinguish between process innovation that
introduces new machinery and process innovation that introduces new methods to organize
production, reecting the distinction in Teece (1977). The ESEE bases its survey questions
on an OECD publication, the Oslo Manual, which was designed to formalize guidelines for
collecting and using data on industrial innovation. It acknowledges the ne line between an
organizational innovation and other types of process innovation by noting that "a starting
point for distinguishing process and/or organizational innovations is the type of activity." In
particular, "organizational innovations deal primarily with people and the organization of
work." Accordingly, the ESEE asks respondents whether their rm has undertaken a process
improvement that involves the use of new machines and/or the use of new methods to orga-
nize production. Some examples of the latter are "practices to improve knowledge sharing,"
"education and training systems," "new methods for distributing responsibilities and de-
cision making" and "management systems for general production or supply operations."
Although we do not have any further details on the nature of the technology implemented,
22Product innovation could mean upgrading the quality of existing products or, as in Dhingra (2010),
developing new products. See Online Appendix Table S1 for the exact wording of the survey questions.
Note that the questions do not ask whether the rm undertakes R&D activity but, rather, whether they
implement an innovation. Salomon and Shaver (2005) and Salomon (2006) study the relationship among
product innovation, patenting activity, and exporting activity.
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when implementation coincides with acquisition, it is likely that some of these organizational
practices, along with the assimilation of foreign technologies, reect technology transfer from
the parent.
The data contain other information on these rmsactivities that allows us to shed light
on the mechanisms at work in our model. In particular, we know whether a rm exports,
as well as its volume of exports. We also observe whether the rm uses the foreign parent
as a channel for its exports, or if it exports via other means (this information is available
only every four years). We do not know of any other dataset that includes all these detailed
variables for a large panel of rms over an extended period of time (17 years in our data).
We also use the ESEE data to dene two di¤erent variables that measure rm productiv-
ity. The rst is the natural log of the rms real sales, relative to the industry mean (similar
to Verhoogen, 2008). The second is labor productivity dened as the natural logarithm of
real value added per worker, relative to the industry mean (similar to Lileeva and Treer,
2010). The ESEE categorizes rms into 20 industries, based on the two-digit NACE classi-
cation. Summary statistics are given in Table 1, and variable denitions are included in the
notes to the table.
Insert Table 1 around here
4 The Acquisition Decision
A. Estimation Strategy
The rst set of predictions arising from the model reveals which domestic rms are likely
to be the targets of foreign acquisitions. When there is a complementarity between a rms
initial productivity level and the amount of innovation, foreign rms acquire the most pro-
ductive rms in the economy (those with higher 'i), so that there is positive selection. In
an alternative scenario, in which foreign rms transfer their own productivity level to the
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domestic rm regardless of which rms they buy, negative selection emerges: Foreign rms
acquire the least productive rms (those with lower 'i).
We estimate the type of selection at work in the data in the following way: Equation
(4) says that the share of the surplus generated by the acquisition going to the acquiring
rm is equal to K for all acquired rms, and the free entry condition for foreign rms in
the acquisition market implies that acquisition takes place whenever
 
V Fi   V Di
  K.
Rearranging this inequality, we denote F it =
 
V Fi   V Di
 K. The binary outcome of the
acquisition decision Fit can be seen as reecting a threshold rule for the underlying latent
variable F it, so that Fit = 1 (foreign ownership) if F

it  0 and Fit = 0 (domestic ownership)
if F it < 0. We also allow the average probability of acquisition to vary by year and industry
by including year (dt) and industry (ds) dummies. Given these assumptions, the probability
that a given rm i in industry s is acquired in year t can be estimated using the following
linear approximation:
(5) Fit =  + 'it 1 + dt + ds + it
We rst measure the productivity of rm i, 'i0, in the base year (the rst year the rm
appears in the data, which we subsequently exclude from the analysis) and examine the
probability in the data that a rm will ever be acquired (such that we use one observation
per rm). We then allow for a time-varying measure of lagged productivity, 'it 1, to examine
the probability of being acquired in any given year, conditional on being domestically owned
the year before. Empirically, lagged and initial productivity are highly positively correlated,
but the ordering of rms based on lagged productivity may better reect the attractiveness
of any one rm at the time of potential purchase.
Under the assumptions of the model, b is predicted to be positive. In contrast, with
negative selection, b is expected to be negative. Hence, the observed selection e¤ect o¤ers
insight into the actual nature of the potential technology transfer from multinational parents
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to domestic subsidiaries.
B. Foreign rms select the most productive domestic rms
Before turning to the analysis, we use our dataset to explore the patterns of selection graph-
ically. Figure 2 plots the distribution of initial productivity for two groups of rms: those
that are acquired by a foreign rm four years after our baseline productivity is computed
and those that remain domestic. One can clearly see that the distribution of acquired rms
(solid line) lies to the right of those that remain domestic. Since our measure of productivity
is demeaned relative to the industry, this does not reect di¤erences in rm size by industry.
Figure 3 reproduces Figure 2 by industry. A striking pattern emerges: Positive selection is
present in every industry. These two gures provide prima facie evidence that the positive
selection predicted in our model dominates in the Spanish data.
Insert Figures 2 and 3 around here
We now turn to a more systematic analysis and estimate equation (5) to establish this rst
fact. The estimated coe¢ cients using a linear probability model are shown in Panels A and
B of Table 2 (Online Appendix Table S2 shows that results are similar when using a probit
specication). The dependent variable in all columns is the indicator for foreign ownership,
and this is regressed on our two proxies for initial productivity. These are the logarithm
of real rm sales (Columns 1 to 3) and the logarithm of labor productivity (Columns 4
to 6), each relative to its industry mean. The regressions in Panel A use baseline (initial)
productivity measured by these two variables and one observation per rm to estimate the
probability of ever being foreign-acquired (within the sample). Panel B uses (time-varying)
lagged productivity as an independent variable to estimate the probability of being acquired
in any given year, conditional on being domestic the year before. All regressions include
industry dummies. Additionally, Panel B includes year dummies and industry trends, so the
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results can be interpreted as within-industry di¤erences in the probability of acquisition as
a function of initial productivity, controlling for possible di¤erential trends in acquisitions
by industry.
Insert Table 2 around here
Regardless of the productivity measure used, we nd that more productive rms are more
likely to become foreign-owned. For example, the coe¢ cient in Column 1a (0.0351) implies
that, conditional on being domestic the year the rm enters the sample, a one standard
deviation increase in initial productivity makes a rm six percentage points more likely to
be acquired by the end of the sample. The same increase in lagged productivity is associated
with a one-percent higher yearly probability of being acquired (Column 1b).23
Columns 2 and 5 replace the productivity variable with indicator variables for each pro-
ductivity quartile. For example, in Column 2a, being in the second sales quartile increases
the probability of becoming foreign-owned during the sample years by 3.3 percentage points
relative to rms in the rst quartile (corresponding to a yearly gure of 0.4 in Column 2b);
being in the third quartile by 4.8 percentage points (1.1 yearly, in Column 2b); and being
in the highest productivity quartile by as much as 14.8 percentage points (2.7 yearly, in
Column 2b). A similar pattern emerges when using labor productivity as the productivity
measure. Therefore, rms at the upper end of the productivity distribution are substantially
more likely to become foreign-owned, and the e¤ect is increasing in rm productivity, with
rms in the upper quartile having a much higher probability of acquisition.
Finally, Columns 3 and 6 explore the possibility that foreign rms are selecting exporters
(because, for example, exporting rms have less exchange rate exposure), and exporting is
positively correlated with initial productivity. We introduce a dummy variable for exporting
status and interact it with initial productivity. Initial productivity always remains positively
23Table 1 shows that 3.5 percent of our observations are rms under foreign ownership. This corresponds
to 165 rms (or 4.6 percent) being acquired during the sample.
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related to the probability of being acquired, regardless of export status. There is also some
evidence that multinationals are more likely to target exporters, but we nd no systematic
evidence of di¤erential positive selection among exporters. So, overall, even though some
rms may be acquired because of their exporter status, positive selection persists, and multi-
nationals are more likely to acquire the most productive rms among both exporters and
non-exporters.
Table 2, therefore, reinforces the results from Figures 2 and 3 and shows that, within
our cross-section of rms, the more productive domestic rms are more likely to become
foreign-owned evidence of positive selection and the presence of "cherry-picking." These
selection patterns are inconsistent with a model in which foreign rms always nd it optimal
to transfer their superior technology across international (or rm) borders to any domestic
rm, as is often assumed.
While the results in a number of papers point to the presence of positive selection by
foreign rms in other countries (e.g., for Chile, Ramondo, 2009; for Indonesia, Arnold and
Javorcik, 2009; for the U.K., Criscuolo and Martin, 2009), to the best of our knowledge,
no prior studies have explained this empirical regularity. When viewed within the context
of our model, our nding suggests that acquisition patterns reect an underlying comple-
mentarity between the initial productivity of the acquired rm and the extent of innovation
post-acquisition. As we will see later, this nding has signicant implications for the rela-
tionship between multinational activity in a country and the evolution of the productivity
distribution.
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5 The Innovation Decision
A. Estimation Strategy: Fixed E¤ects and Propensity Score
Having established that foreign rms positively select domestic rms as targets, we now test
the set of predictions relating productivity-enhancing investments to acquisition namely,
that upon being acquired, foreign subsidiaries invest more in innovation than they would
have done had they remained domestic. Our model suggests that acquired rms undertake
more investment activity, controlling for the initial productivity of the acquired rm. This
can be seen in Figure 1 as the di¤erence between Fi and 
D
i :
The optimal level of investment under each ownership structure is determined by the rst-
order condition given in equation (2). In this case, innovation can increase upon acquisition
for several reasons. The foreign rm could provide access to a larger market and/or bring





Our innovation variables are based on the rm-level responses to the questions about
whether the rm made specic types of innovation in that year, which we interpret as
improvements to rm technology. We are interested in how the rms technology, which is
the result of successive innovations, changes with foreign ownership. Since, at any point in
time, the rms technology can be characterized as the sum of innovations made up to that
point, we use the yearly variables on rm-level innovation described in Section 3 to measure
the rms technology at time t as: Iit =
Pt
j=t0
Iij, where t0 is the year the rm entered
the data.24 Any di¤erences in technology across rms in the year they enter the data will
be captured by the rm xed e¤ects in our empirical specications.25 As a result, all the
variation in a rms innovative activity and the resulting technology level that we relate
24We have allowed the stock of innovation to depreciate at di¤erent rates over time. The results are
qualitatively similar to the ones presented with this the simplest specication.
25First-di¤erences specications of the estimations with three di¤erent measures of the innovation stock
(process innovation; product innovation; and process innovation that includes both new machines and new
organizational practices) are presented as a robustness test in Appendix Table 1.
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to changes in the rms ownership structure occurs within the sample.26
Empirically, we rst estimate the e¤ect of acquisition on technology using the panel
structure of the dataset and including year xed e¤ects as follows:
(6) Iit =  + Fit 1 +
X
j
jXjit 2 + dt + i + it
where Iit is a proxy for productivity-enhancing innovation. The fact that the level of pro-
ductivity 'i a¤ects investment directly for foreign-owned rms is absorbed by the rm xed
e¤ects, i, along with any other permanent unobserved characteristics of rms. Including
rm xed e¤ects implies that the estimated parameter b is a measure of the change in in-
vestment after being acquired, controlling for the fact that foreign rms choose to acquire
higher initial-productivity rms, and this is predicted to be positive.
The xed e¤ects specication controls for selection based on time-invariant rm charac-
teristics (e.g., initial productivity). However, it is important in the context of our 17-year
panel to acknowledge that rm characteristics may evolve di¤erently over time (for reasons
outside the model) and impact multinational selection decisions di¤erentially. In particular,
selection may be driven by lagged rm characteristics and decisions that could be correlated
with future innovation. To address this and ensure that the estimates of the parameter
 reect changes in innovation activity associated with acquisition, we use three di¤erent
strategies. First, we rst include Xjit 2, a set of j rm-level characteristics, lagged relative
to the acquisition decision, that control for selection on time-varying observables.27 Second,
26Online Appendix Table S3 shows that each measure of the stock of innovation Iit, enters the production
function as a signicant shifter of productivity.
27The variables that may be correlated both with being acquired and with subsequent innovation activity
that are included as controls are: (1) the log of the level of rm sales; (2) the log of labor productivity (to
control for time varying selection on rm size and productivity); (3) the log of sales growth (to control for
time-varying selection on productivity growth); (4) export status (to control for time-varying selection on
the international presence of these rms and potentially related productivity e¤ects not captured by other
variables); (5) average wage (to control for potential selection on changes in the skill mix of rms); (6) log
capital per employee; and (7) log capital (to control for potential selection on the evolving level of capital
and capital intensity of rms).
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we include an indicator in equation (6) for whether the rm is acquired in the current period
(Fit) and in the following period (Fit+1). This allows us to test directly in the data whether
there was a change in the dependent variable that was already taking place prior to the
acquisition (in which case, the coe¢ cient on the lead variable should be di¤erent from zero).
Third, we use a propensity score estimator to reweight rms in equation (6) to reect
di¤erences in the probability of being acquired based on prior characteristics. We calculate
the propensity score for each rm in the following way. For each year, we consider rms
acquired in that year as treated observations and rms that are never acquired as control
observations. We pool treated and control observations across all years to estimate the
probability that a rm is acquired as a function of a number of characteristics (see Lechner,
1999). This estimated probability is the propensity score, bp. The characteristics used to
obtain the propensity score are lagged productivity (measured by both log rm sales and log
labor productivity), lagged log sales growth, lagged export status, lagged average wage, lag
of the process innovation stock, innovation activity in the previous year, lagged log capital
per employee, lagged log capital and a year trend. We also allow for this relationship to vary
across industries by estimating the propensity score separately for each industry.28
One can transform the propensity score estimates into weights such that the propensity
score reweighted regression yields a consistent estimate of a parameter of interest (Dehejia
and Wahba, 1999; Busso, DiNardo and McCrary, 2009). Specically, weighting each treated
rm by 1=bp, and weighting each control rm by 1=(1 bp) provides an estimate of the Average
Treatment E¤ect (ATE) of acquisition on innovation in a specication like equation (6).29
28We also performed the standard tests to check that the balancing hypothesis holds within each industry.
We found that all covariates are balanced between treated and control observations for all blocks in all
industries.
The relationships between each of these variables and the probability of being acquired are shown in Online
Appendix Table S4. Lagged ln rm sales is the most signicant predictor of acquisition, consistent with our
model.
29Since never-acquired control rms may be used as controls more than once, we sum the control weights
by rm to obtain the weight for the control rm (Lechner, 1999). We also winsorize the weights at one
percent because of extreme outliers in the weights. The results are not sensitive to the exact outlier cut-o¤.
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We restrict the analysis to rms that fall within the common support. Busso, DiNardo and
McCrary (2009) show that the nite sample properties of this propensity score reweighting
estimator are superior to the propensity score matching techniques (where each treated rm
is matched to one or several controls).
The propensity score reweighting estimator obtained by reweighting observations in equa-
tion (6) allows us to control not only for selection into being acquired on time-invariant
characteristics of rms (just like the equal-weighted xed e¤ects regression), but also for
time-varying characteristics through the propensity score. The underlying assumption in
the estimation is that, conditional on observable time-varying and any time-invariant char-
acteristics that a¤ect selection, treatment is random. Hence, outcomes for treated rms
are attributable only to treatment status (this is typically referred to as the ignorability
assumption, or selection on observables).
B. Acquired rms undertake more innovation
Since we have detailed information on the types of innovation domestic rms undertake
upon foreign acquisition, our data allow us to shed light on the actual process of technology
adoption by domestic rms, and on precisely what types of innovations are more likely to be
adopted/transferred.
Our measures of innovation are specic actions related to the implementation of product
and process innovation, as well as the assimilation of foreign technologies. All the columns in
Table 3 reect regressions of an innovation variable on the lagged foreign ownership variable.
As we will see, we observe empirically that innovations take place mainly with a one-year
lag, reecting the fact that it takes some time for rm strategies to change after acquisition.
Lagging this independent variable also reduces possible concerns about reverse causation.
Insert Table 3 around here
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In Table 3, we report the results for each investment proxy variable: process innovation
(Panel A), product innovation (Panel B) and assimilation of foreign technologies (Panel C).
The rst column in each panel includes only rm xed e¤ects; the second also includes
industry-specic time trends; the third adds a large set of lagged controls (to control for
possible di¤erences in innovation related to previous rm characteristics); the fourth column
also adds the lead and contemporaneous indicators of acquisition; the fth column presents
the propensity score reweighted estimates.30
The xed e¤ects specications in Columns 1 to 3 of Panel A show that process innovation
is positively and signicantly associated with foreign ownership. Column 1a shows that a
foreign-acquired rm is 57-percent more likely to have undertaken a process innovation while
foreign-owned, relative to a rm that stays domestic. This estimate is robust to controlling
for industry trends and lagged rm characteristics (Columns 2a and 3a). Column 4a shows
that the coe¢ cient estimate on the lead indicator for acquisition is not signicantly di¤erent
from zero. Furthermore, it is signicantly smaller than the coe¢ cient of interest (as shown
by the p-value of 0.048). Column 5a presents the propensity score reweighted regressions
that allow us to control for time-varying selection. The coe¢ cient 0.611 is similar to earlier
columns and also highly signicant, implying that rms undertake more process innovation
upon acquisition.31
Turning to the second and third panels of Table 3, the estimated coe¢ cients in Column
1 reveal that product innovation and the assimilation of foreign technologies also increase
after acquisition. However, the point estimates fall, and the standard errors are larger with
further controls and in the propensity score estimation.32 These results are the average over
30As we will see, the number of observations changes with the specication used, because of changes in the
number of non-missing observations as we include more variables and their lags. Online Appendix Tables
S6 and S7 repeat all the analysis that follows restricting the sample to only the non-missing observations of
the most restrictive sample. The results are similar, so we chose to provide the estimates on the unrestricted
sample in the main body of the paper.
31The results shown in the rst di¤erences specications in Appendix Table 1 reveal that this increase
occurs only one year after acquisition, with further increases in the second and third years.
32Note that the variable indicating the assimilation of foreign technologies is available only every four
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all types of acquired rms, and as we will see in the next subsection, there is evidence that
these two types of innovation increase signicantly in rms that export through the foreign
parent after acquisition.
Table 4 shows the e¤ect of foreign ownership on the disaggregated measures of process
innovation. We distinguish between rms that report to have invested only in new machines
(Panel B), only in new methods of organizing production (Panel C), or in both simultane-
ously (Panel A). The results reveal some interesting contrasts. While foreign-acquired rms
are not signicantly more likely to only introduce new machinery or only introduce new
ways of organizing production, the simultaneous introduction of new machinery and new
organizational processes is signicantly associated with foreign acquisition (Teece, 1977).
Panel A shows this result. Both the xed e¤ects specications of Columns 1a to 4a and
the propensity score estimation of Column 5a show that upon acquisition, rms are more
likely to introduce new machines and new organizational methods simultaneously. This is an
interesting result since we might have expected that foreign rms would also be more likely
to introduce either type of process innovation independently. The ndings are consistent
with the complementarities found by Black and Lynch (2001), Bresnahan et al. (2002), and
Bartel et al. (2007) between di¤erent types of technology upgrading. Since rms appear to
introduce both types of innovations jointly, it is important to allow for the e¤ect of both
actions when quantifying the multinational productivity advantage.33
Insert Table 4 around here
years, reducing the number of observations in these specications and, thus, reducing the power of the xed
e¤ects results since we have, at most, ve observations within a rm for this variable.
33All of our results are robust to the analysis of rms that report no change in reporting unit throughout
the time they are in the sample, as well as restricting the sample to rms that report no changes in the
number of establishments. This rules out the concern that the denition of the reporting unit changes
following acquisition.
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C. The Role of Market Access Provided by the Foreign Parent
These ndings on increased process innovation following acquisition, together with our pos-
itive selection results, are consistent with a world in which multinationals choose to acquire
the most productive rms since that is where the returns to their investment are highest.
One explanation for this is that as proposed in the literature on the sources of multinational
advantage the foreign rm gives access to technology at a lower cost (bi) than the acquired
rm would have faced had it remained under domestic control. However, we highlight an
alternative reason for our ndings, based on a key feature of multinationals: They often
grant their subsidiaries access to a larger global market.
Tables 5 and 6 explore whether innovation decisions are related to the fact that foreign
ownership provides access to foreign markets. We regress the innovation variables on indi-
cator variables for whether the rm exports, and for whether the rm exports through the
foreign parent. Exporting through the foreign parent may mean that the rm is using the
parents distribution channels and networks to export, or that it sells its goods directly to
the foreign parent (as part of a global production system). The base category includes all the
channels that were always available to the domestic rms (exporting through its own means,
using a Spanish specialized intermediary or cooperative export agreements with other rms).
Table 5 presents the results for overall process innovation (Panel A) and for process
innovation that involves the simultaneous introduction of new machines and new methods
of organizing production (Panel B). Column 1a reveals that exporting is positively associ-
ated with investment in process innovation, consistent with the ndings of previous studies
(Verhoogen, 2008; Bustos, 2011; Lileeva and Treer, 2010; Aw et al., 2011). This result
holds when controlling for foreign ownership (Column 2a), which is also signicant, which
suggests that the ownership mechanism outlined in this paper o¤ers a separate explanation
for acquired rmsincreased process innovation.
Insert Table 5 around here
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Columns 3a to 5a introduce our key variable of interest, showing xed e¤ects regressions
using process innovation as a dependent variable, where we include the indicator variable
for whether the rm exports via the foreign parent. Notably, we nd that starting to export
through a foreign parent has a large and signicant coe¢ cient. Since this specication also
includes the interaction between exporting and being foreign owned, this suggests that it is
not exporting while foreign-owned per se, but exporting through the foreign parent, that is
associated with innovation.34
Since we can distinguish between di¤erent types of process innovation, we evaluate the
type that exporters are more likely to undertake. Although exporting is, on average, not
signicantly associated with the simultaneous introduction of new machines and new forms of
organizing production (Column 1b), foreign-owned rms are more likely to engage in this type
of process innovation (Column 2b). Column 3b shows that, similar to the process innovation
results in Column 3a, innovation is driven mainly by the foreign-owned exporters that export
via the foreign parent. In contrast, we nd that exporting is signicantly associated with the
introduction of new machines exclusively, while exporting through a foreign parent is not
(unreported). This reinforces our ndings in Table 4, which suggest that foreign ownership
leads to a specic type of process innovation, involving both new machines and new methods
of organizing production.35
Columns 6 through 8 in Table 5 present the propensity score results for the market
access channel, allowing us to better control for time-varying selection. Here, we consider
the treatment to be starting to export through the foreign parent, and we recalculate the
propensity score and the associated weights for each rm as described in Section 5.B. Column
6 shows that exporting through a foreign parent is associated with more process innovation
34Consistent with the idea that foreign rms provide market access to exporting subsidiary rms in our
data, Artopoulos, Friel and Hallak (2011) document that rms with knowledge of business practices in foreign
markets are more successful exporters. We argue that foreign rms can provide that knowledge.
35We nd no evidence that exporting through a foreign parent leads to the introduction of new machines
or new organizational practices separately (results unreported).
28
(Column 6a) and, in particular, with innovation that involves the simultaneous introduction
of new machines and new organizational practices (Column 6b). This result holds when
controlling for lagged foreign ownership (Column 7), exporting status, and their interaction,
and industry time trends (Column 8).
Table 6 shows the e¤ect of market access through the foreign parent on product innovation
and the assimilation of foreign technologies. Using both the xed e¤ects and the propensity
score estimator, we nd that exporting via a foreign parent leads to more product innovation
and the assimilation of foreign technologies. These results shed light on those in Table 3,
where we found a statistically weaker relationship between foreign ownership and these two
variables. Once we distinguish between foreign-owned rms that export via a foreign parent
and those that do not, we see that those that use the parent as an export channel also invest
in new products and assimilate new foreign technologies.
Insert Table 6 around here
Taken together, these results imply that when rms are acquired by a foreign parent, they
increase innovation, especially when the parent rm provides access to export markets. The
observed relationship between market access and innovation activity o¤ers further support
for the mechanism outlined in the model, as it highlights the role for market access as
a driver of innovation decisions. It also indicates that market access can be a su¢ cient
reason for acquisition (even when foreign and domestic rms face similar variable innovation
costs) when larger market access increases the potential benets from investment activity.
Furthermore, to the extent that there is persistence in market access, it provides a rationale
for persistent productivity di¤erences among rms.
D. Exports and Wages
Finally, in Table 7, we show other changes that take place within rms as a consequence of
foreign ownership. We study how the share of exports in total sales (Panel A), the logarithm
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of total exports for exporters (Panel B) and the logarithm of average rm wage (computed
as the total wage bill divided by the number of employees, Panel C) change with foreign
acquisition. Columns 1 through 4 show the equal-weighted xed-e¤ects specication, and
Column 5 shows the propensity score reweighted results.
Insert Table 7 around here
We nd that the proportion of exports in total sales increases signicantly following for-
eign acquisition. The propensity score estimate in Column 5a shows that the share of exports
is, on average, 6.7 percentage points higher in each year for acquired rms than for similar
rms that are not acquired. The fact that the sales increase is disproportionately large in
foreign markets is consistent with subsidiaries having increased access to these markets after
acquisition. We also nd that the volume of exports for exporters is 33-percent higher for
exporters under foreign ownership (Column 5b). Finally, Panel C provides some suggestive
evidence of average wages increasing upon acquisition, although this is not statistically sig-
nicant. While this could mean that rms are increasing their wages and/or upgrading the
skill of the workforce, we cannot distinguish between these possibilities with the available
data.
6 Foreign Ownership and Productivity Evolution
Section 4.B showed that there is positive selection of target rms by foreign multinationals;
and Section 5.B established that, upon acquisition, rms upgrade their technology by doing
more process innovation and, in particular, by investing simultaneously in new machines
and new methods to organize production. Now, we investigate the e¤ect of acquisition on
rm productivity directly, as well as its consequences for the evolution of the distribution of
productivity within industries.
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Under the assumption that the investment activities described above are, indeed, productivity-
enhancing, we predict that the increased levels of these activities upon acquisition lead to
higher productivity for acquired rms. Figures 4 and 5 illustrate our basic productivity
results. Figure 4 shows the distribution of rm productivity in the base year, and four
years after that, for rms that are domestic in that rst year but will be foreign-owned four
years later. The distribution is shifted to the right, indicating that productivity increased
for acquired rms after acquisition over the whole distribution of rm initial productivity.
Figure 5 shows the distribution of productivity in the base year and four years later for
rms that remained domestic. While there is a slight increase in productivity, it is much less
pronounced than for foreign-acquired rms.
Insert Figure 4 around here
Table 8 shows the results of estimating equation (6) with our measures of productivity
as the dependent variable. Column 1 in Panels A and B (for each productivity measure)
estimates equation (6) without rm xed e¤ects; Columns 2, 3, 4 and 5, progressively add
rm xed e¤ects, industry trends, further selection controls, and lead and contemporaneous
indicators of acquisition. Column 6 shows the propensity score reweighting estimates.
Insert Table 8 around here
The point estimates are much larger in the cross-sectional estimation of Column 1 relative
to any of the other columns that include xed e¤ects and better control for selection using
the propensity score. This reects the fact that the positive selection identied earlier will
lead to substantial over-estimation of the productivity advantage in cross-sectional analysis
(as also demonstrated by Criscuolo and Martin, 2009) by as much as three times in the case
of labor productivity. However, we also nd that acquisition is signicantly positively associ-
ated with increased productivity, controlling for selection. The propensity score reweighted
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specications in Column 6 imply that, after acquisition, real sales increase by 18 percent and
labor productivity by 11 percent, on average.36
Finally, we discuss the implications of our ndings for the evolution of the distribution
of productivity within industries. We show that foreign rms are more likely to acquire the
most productive rms within industries (Table 2), and that, upon acquisition, rms innovate
(Table 3), increasing productivity (Table 8). This set of results implies that acquisition
activity can lead to an increase in the dispersion of the productivity distribution. This is an
important consequence of our earlier ndings since it has implications for the evolution of
within-industry productivity distributions as more foreign rms enter an industry. Under this
mechanism, foreign entry does not lead to productivity convergence, but, on the contrary,
could lead to further divergence.37 Of course, there could be other reasons (such as spillover
e¤ects or other externalities) why multinational entry may improve less productive rms
productivity. However, the direct e¤ect of the foreign acquisition process is an increase in
productivity heterogeneity.
7 Conclusion
In this paper, we use rich and detailed data on Spanish manufacturing rms to establish
that foreign rms acquire the best rms within industries ("cherry-picking"), but also invest
more in a number of innovation activities upon acquisition. In particular, controlling for the
selection e¤ect, rms increase their process innovation, with the simultaneous introduction
36Unlike the measures of innovation activity, the productivity measures are based on reported revenues.
There may be incentives to change how revenues are reported within a multinational by adjusting transfer
prices, a¤ecting domestic rms once acquired. For example, reported revenues could reect removal of double
marginalization upon integration. This e¤ect could lead to a decline in revenues, but this is not present in
the data. The multinational may also face incentives to misreport the location of prots for tax purposes.
We expect this problem to be small, given relative Spanish tax rates.
37If multinational entry also serves to raise the threshold level of productivity at which rms exit the
domestic market (as in Helpman et al., 2004), the lowest-productivity surviving rm in the distribution will
have a higher productivity level. This general equilibrium e¤ect will serve to o¤set the increase in dispersion
described above.
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of new machines and organizational practices. Acquired rms that export through their
parent rm also report that they increase their product innovation and start to assimilate
more foreign technologies.
We develop a simple model that illustrates how these two facts can be fundamentally
related. The model relies on standard assumptions about production, rm heterogeneity,
consumer demand and market competition (Helpman and Krugman, 1985; Melitz, 2003)
and incorporates two well-known characteristics of multinational rms: Multinationals grant
access to larger markets and/or have lower technology-implementation costs. Since the incen-
tives for innovation and acquisition are increasing in initial productivity, the surplus created
by the acquisition is also increasing in initial productivity. Therefore, foreign rms nd it
more protable to acquire the most productive rms and to innovate more on acquisition.
The observed positive selection suggests that there are complementarities between in-
novation activity and the initial characteristics of the acquired rm that could go beyond
any possible technological complementarity between rms with similar productivity levels.
Our results also suggest a complementarity between market access and innovation. Taken
together, these ndings can explain a number of important facts: rst, why more productive
rms innovate more; second, why foreign rms acquire the most productive rms within
industries; and third, why foreign-owned rms increase their innovation upon acquisition.38
Our contribution is to illustrate the drivers of the innovation process and to highlight that
superior or proprietary technologies from the parent rm are not necessary to generate the
prediction that a given rm nds it optimal to invest more under foreign control than under
domestic control.
In addition, the observed complementarity between market scale and innovation o¤ers
38The paper does not address why a foreign rm chooses to enter via acquisition rather than through an
arms length relationship, the subject of a large literature. As discussed in Blonigen (2005), this decision is
thought to hinge on the value of internalizing rm-specic assets. Note that the model predictions evaluated
in the data in this paper hold even without contractual incompleteness around the technology transfer
between di¤erent parts of the rm.
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one explanation for why all rms do not imitate the practices of high productivity rms
in the market and why productivity di¤erences persist. To the best of our knowledge,
we are the rst to link market scale to the jointly determined acquisition outcomes and
innovation incentives. Finally, while we focus on the multinational rms acquisition choice,
the economic mechanism we emphasize should also be relevant for purely domestic integration
decisions when the acquirer facilitates access to larger markets.
34
Appendix
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35
References
[1] Antras, Pol. 2003. "Firms, Contracts, and Trade Structure." Quarterly Journal of Eco-
nomics, 118(4): 1375-1418.
[2] Antras, Pol, and Elhanan Helpman. 2004. "Global Sourcing." Journal of Political Econ-
omy, 112(3): 552-580.
[3] Arnold, Jens and Beata Javorcik. 2009. "Gifted kids or pushy parents? Foreign direct
investment and plant productivity in Indonesia." Journal of International Economics,
79(1): 42-53.
[4] Artopoulos, Alejandro, Daniel Friel and Juan Carlos Hallak. 2011. "Lifting the Domes-
tic Veil: The Challenges of Exporting Di¤erentiated Goods Across the Development
Divide." NBER Working Paper 16947.
[5] Atkeson, Andrew and Ariel Burstein. 2010. "Innovation, Firm dynamics, and Interna-
tional Trade." Journal of Political Economy, 118(3): 433-484.
[6] Aw, Bee Yan, Mark Roberts, and Daniel Yi Xu. 2011. "R&D Investment, Exporting,
and Productivity Dynamics." American Economic Review, 101(4): 1312-1344.
[7] Baldwin, John, and Wulong Gu. 2005. Global Links: Multinationals, Foreign Owner-
ship and Productivity Growth in Canadian Manufacturing, The Canadian Economy in
Transition. Statistics Canada, Economic Analysis Division.
[8] Barba Navaretti, Giorgio, Anthony Venables. 2004. Multinational Firms in the World
Economy. Princeton University Press.
[9] Bartel, Ann, Casey Ichniowski and Kathryn Shaw, 2007. "How Does Information Tech-
nology Really A¤ect Productivity? Plant-Level Comparisons of Product Innovation,
36
Process Improvement and Worker Skills." Quarterly Journal of Economics, 122 (4):
1721-1758.
[10] Black, Sandra, and Lisa Lynch. 2001. "How to Compete: The Impact of Workplace
Practices and Information Technology on Productivity." Review of Economics and Sta-
tistics, 83: 434-445.
[11] Blonigen, Bruce. 2005. "A Review of the Empirical Literature on FDI Determinants."
Atlantic Economic Journal, 33: 383-403.
[12] Bloom, Nicholas, Rafaella Sadun and John Van Reenen. Forthcoming. "Americans Do
I.T. Better. US Multinationals and the Productivity Miracle." American Economic Re-
view.
[13] Bloom, Nicholas, and John Van Reenen. 2007. "Measuring and Explaining Management
Practices Across Firms and Countries." Quarterly Journal of Economics, 122(4): 1351-
1408.
[14] Bloom, Nicholas, and John Van Reenen. 2010. "Why Do Management Practices Di¤er
across Firms and Countries?" Journal of Economic Perspectives, 24 (1): 203-224.
[15] Branstetter, Lee, Raymond Fisman, and Fritz Foley. 2006. "Do Stronger Intellectual
Property Rights Increase International Technology Transfer? Empirical Evidence from
U.S. Firm-Level Panel Data." Quarterly Journal of Economics, 121(1): 321-349.
[16] Bresnahan, Timothy, Erik Brynjolfsson, and Loren Hitt. 2002. Information Technol-
ogy, Work Organization, and the Demand for Skilled Labor: Firm-Level Evidence,
Quarterly Journal of Economics, 117: 339-376.
[17] Burstein, Ariel, and Alexander Monge-Naranjo. 2009. "Foreign Know-How, Firm Con-
trol, and the Income of Developing Countries." Quarterly Journal of Economics, 124(1):
149-195.
37
[18] Busso, Matias, John DiNardo, and Justin McCrary. 2009. "New Evidence on the Finite
Sample Properties of Propensity Score Matching and Reweighting Estimators", mimeo.
[19] Bustos, Paula. 2011. "Trade Liberalization, Exports, and Technology Upgrading: Ev-
idence on the Impact of MERCOSUR on Argentinean Firms." American Economic
Review, 101(1): 304-340.
[20] Caves, Richard. 1974. "Multinational Firms, Competition and Productivity in Host-
Country Markets." Economica, 41(162): 176-93.
[21] Caves, Richard. 1996.Multinational Enterprise and Economic Analysis, Second Edition.
New York: Cambridge University Press.
[22] Cohen, Wesley, and Daniel Levinthal. 1990. "Absorptive Capacity: A New Perspective
on Learning and Innovation," Administrative Science Quarterly, 35(1), 128-152.
[23] Criscuolo, Chiara, and Ralf Martin. 2009. "Multinationals and U.S. Productivity Lead-
ership: Evidence from Great Britain." Review of Economics and Statistics, 91(2): 263-
281.
[24] Dehejia, Rajeev, and Sadek Wahba. 1999. "Causal E¤ects in Nonexperimental Studies:
Reevaluating the Evaluation of Training Programs." Journal of the American Statistical
Association, 94(448): 1053-1062.
[25] Desai, Mihir, Fritz Foley, and Kristin Forbes. 2008. "Financial Constraints and Growth:
Multinational and Local Firm Responses to Currency Depreciations." Review of Finan-
cial Studies, 21(6): 2857-2888.
[26] Desai, Mihir, Fritz Foley, and James Hines Jr. 2004. "A Multinational Perspective on
Capital Structure Choice and Internal Capital Markets." Journal of Finance, 59(6):
2451-2488.
38
[27] Dixit, Avinash, and Joseph Stiglitz. 1977. Monopolistic Competition and Optimum
Product Diversity.American Economic Review, 67(3): 297-308.
[28] Dhingra, Swati. 2010. "Trading Away Wide Brands for Cheap Brands." Mimeo.
[29] Doms, Mark, and J. Bradford Jensen. 1998. Comparing Wages, Skills and Productivity
Between Domestically and Foreign-Owned Manufacturing Establishments in the United
States. Geography and Ownerships as Basis for Economic Accounting, Baldwin, R.E.,
R.E., Lipsey, and J.D., Richardson, (Eds). Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
[30] Ekholm, Karolina, Rikard Forslid, and James Markusen. 2007. "Export-Platform For-
eign Direct Investment." Journal of the European Economic Association, 5(4): 776-795.
[31] Encuesta Sobre Estrategias Empresarials (ESEE). 1990-2006. Fundacion Empresa Pub-
lica.
[32] Hanson, Gordon, Raymond Mataloni, and Matthew Slaughter. 2005. "Vertical Pro-
duction Networks in Multinational Firms." Review of Economics and Statistics 87(4):
664-678.
[33] Helpman, Elhanan, and Paul Krugman. 1985. Market Structure and Foreign Trade:
Increasing Returns, Imperfect Competition, and the International Economy. Cambridge:
MIT Press.
[34] Helpman, Elhanan, Marc Melitz, and Stephen Yeaple. 2004. "Export Versus FDI with
Heterogeneous Firms." American Economic Review, 94(1): 300-316.
[35] Ichniowski, Casey, and Kathryn Shaw. 2010. Insider Econometrics: A Roadmap to
Estimating Empirical Models of Organizational Performance.The Handbook of Orga-
nizational Economics, R. Gibbons and J. Roberts ed. Princeton: Princeton University
Press.
39
[36] Imbens, Guido. 2004. "Nonparametric Estimation of Average Treatment E¤ects Under
Exogeneity: A Review." Review of Economics and Statistics, 86(1): 4-29.
[37] Jensen, Michael C., and Richard S. Ruback. 1983. "The Market for Corporate Control:
The Scientic Evidence." Journal of Financial Economics, 11(1-4): 5-50.
[38] Lechner, Michael. 1999. "Earnings and Employment E¤ects of Continuous O¤-the-Job
Training in East Germany after Unication." Journal of Business & Economic Statistics,
17: 74-90.
[39] Lileeva, Alla, and Daniel Treer. 2010. "Improved Access to Foreign Markets Raises
Plant-Level Productivity ... for Some Plants." Quarterly Journal of Economics, 125(3):
1051-1099.
[40] Lichtenberg, Frank, and Donald Siegel. 1987. "Productivity and changes in ownership
of manufacturing plants." Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 3: 643-683.
[41] Manova, Kalina, Shang-Jin Wei, and Zhiwei Zhang. 2011. "Firm Exports and Multina-
tional Activity Under Credit Constraints." NBER Working Paper 16905.
[42] Markusen, James R. 2002. Multinational Firms and the Theory of International Trade.
Cambridge: MIT Press.
[43] McGrattan, Ellen, and Edward Prescott. 2010. "Technology Capital and the U.S. Cur-
rent Account." American Economic Review, 100(4): 1493-1522
[44] Melitz, Marc. 2003. "The Impact of Trade on Intra-Industry Reallocations and Aggre-
gate Industry Productivity." Econometrica, 71(6): 1695-1725.
[45] Nocke, Volker and Stephen Yeaple. 2007. "Cross-Border Mergers and Acquisitions versus
Greeneld Foreign Direct Investment: The Role of Firm Heterogeneity". Journal of
International Economics, 72(2): 336-365.
40
[46] Nocke, Volker and Stephen Yeaple. 2008. "An Assignment Theory of Foreign Direct
Investment." Review of Economic Studies, 57(2): 529-557.
[47] OECD. 2005. Oslo Manual: Guidelines for Collecting and Interpreting Innovation Data.
[48] OECD.StatExtracts. "Foreign Direct Investment Statistics."
http://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx (accessed December, 2011).
[49] Ramondo, Natalia. 2009. "Foreign Plants and Industry Productivity: Evidence from
Chile." Scandinavian Journal of Economics, 111(4): 789-809.
[50] Ramondo, Natalia, and Andrés Rodríguez-Clare. 2009. "Trade, Multinational Produc-
tion, and the Gains from Openness." NBER Working Paper 15604.
[51] Ravenscraft, David J., and Frederic Scherer. 1987. Mergers, Sell-o¤s and Economic
E¢ ciency. Washington DC: The Brookings Institution.
[52] Salomon, Robert. 2006. "Spillovers to Foreign Market Participants: Assessing the Im-
pact of Export Strategies on Innovative Productivity." Strategic Organization, 4(2):
135-164.
[53] Salomon, Robert, and Myles Shaver. 2005. "Learning by Exporting: New Insights from
Examining Firm Innovation." Journal of Economics and Management Strategy, 14(2):
431-460.
[54] Stiebale, Joel, and Frank Reize. 2011. "The Impact of FDI Through Mergers and Acqui-
sitions on Innovation in Target Firms." International Journal of Industrial Organization,
29: 155-167.
[55] Syverson, Chad. 2011. "What Determines Productivity?" Journal of Economic Litera-
ture, 49(2), 326-365.
41
[56] Teece, David. 1977. "Technology Transfer by Multinational Firms: The Resource Cost
of Transferring Technological Know-how." The Economic Journal, 87(346): 242-261.
[57] Verhoogen, Eric. 2008. "Trade, Quality Upgrading, and Wage Inequality in the Mexican
Manufacturing Sector." Quarterly Journal of Economics, 123(2): 489-530.
42
Figures and Tables 
Figure 1: Productivity Growth as a Function of Initial Productivity  
 
Figure 2: Distribution of Initial Productivity for Acquired and Non-Acquired Firms 
 
Note: The dashed line shows the empirical probability density function (pdf) of initial productivity (measured by ln 
sales demeaned by industry over the sample period) of firms that are domestic at time t and will stay domestic at 
time t+4. The bold line shows the empirical pdf of initial productivity of firms that are domestic at time t, but will 
become foreign-owned by time t+4. 
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Figure 3: Selection by Industry  
    
    
    
Note: This figure reproduces Figure 2 by industry. 
44
Figure 4: Distribution of Productivity for Acquired Firms, Before and After the Foreign 
Acquisition 
 
Note: The dashed line shows the empirical probability density function (pdf) of initial productivity (measured by 
log sales demeaned by industry) of firms that are domestic at time t, but will become foreign-owned by time t+4. 
The bold line shows the empirical pdf of productivity of these firms at time t+4 (i.e., after acquisition). 
 
Figure 5: Distribution of Productivity for Non-Acquired Firms, Change over Four Years 
 
Note: The dashed line shows the empirical probability density function (pdf) of initial productivity (measured by 
log sales demeaned by industry) of firms that are domestic at time t and will stay domestic at time t+4. The bold 
line shows the empirical pdf of productivity of these firms at time t+4. 
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Variable Mean Std. deviation N
Foreign 0.035 0.184 20896
Ln Sales 15.372 1.862 20845
Base year ln Sales (demeaned by industry) -0.563 1.723 20845
Ln Labor productivity 10.399 0.680 20527
Base year ln Labor productivity (demeaned by industry) -0.166 0.638 20203
Process Innovation 2.236 2.720 20896
Product Innovation 1.700 2.635 20896
Assimilation of Foreign Technologies 0.350 0.694 5555
New Machines 0.980 1.550 20896
New Methods of Organizing Production 0.305 0.773 20896
Both (new machines and new methods of organization) 0.837 1.677 20896
Export 0.530 0.499 20860
Export via foreign parent 0.016 0.125 5543
Exports/Sales 0.139 0.232 20803
Ln Exports 14.106 2.614 11024
Ln Average wage 10.029 0.447 20841
Table 1. Descriptive Statistics
Notes: The sample includes the observations from all firms in the ESEE (1990-2006) that are not foreign-owned in their 
first year in the sample (potential acquisition targets). Foreign is an indicator variable that equals one if the firm has at least 
50-percent foreign ownership. Ln Sales is the natural logarithm of the firm's real sales. Base year Ln Sales is the natural 
logarithm of the firm's real sales, relative to the industry mean, in the first year the firm appears in the sample. Ln Labor 
productivity is the natural logarithm of real value added per worker (where valued added is calculated by ESEE as the sum 
of sales plus change in inventory, less purchases and costs of goods sold). Base year Ln Labor productivity is the natural 
logarithm of real value added per worker, relative to the industry mean, in the first year the firm appears in the sample. 
Process Innovation, Product Innovation, Assimilation of Foreign Technologies, New Machines, New Methods of 
Organizing Production, and Both are all defined in a similar way, and reflect the stock of reported innovations of each type 
the firm has done during the sample period (see Sections 3 and 5 for more details). Export is an indicator variable that 
equals one if the firm exports any goods. Export via foreign parent is an indicator variable that equals one if the firm 
declares that it exports through a foreign parent. Exports/Sales is the share of exports over total sales. Ln Exports is the 
natural logarithm of real exports. Ln Average wage is the natural logarithm of the real total wage bill per worker. All real 
variables are in 2006 euros (deflated using the equipment deflator for inputs into production function and the industry-level 







































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Panel A 1a 2a 3a 4a 5a
Lag Foreign 0.574*** 0.419** 0.388* 0.411** 0.611**





Observations 20722 20671 14656 12767 17578
R-squared 0.499 0.527 0.529 0.534 0.532
P-value of test Lag Foreign = Forward Foreign 0.0476
Panel B 1b 2b 3b 4b 5b
Lag Foreign 0.387* 0.293 0.0718 0.219 0.227





Observations 20722 20671 14656 12767 17578
R-squared 0.368 0.410 0.406 0.412 0.399
P-value of test Lag Foreign = Forward Foreign 0.150
Panel C 1c 2c 3c 4c 5c
Lag Foreign 0.144* 0.111 0.0565 -0.0318 0.123





Observations 5434 5434 4100 2886 4348
R-squared 0.160 0.200 0.213 0.226 0.188
P-value of test Lag Foreign = Forward Foreign 0.258
Firm FEs yes yes yes yes yes
Industry trends yes yes yes
Selection controls yes yes
Propensity score weighting yes
Product Innovation
Table 3. Foreign Ownership and Innovation 
Notes: Foreign is an indicator variable that equals one if the firm has at least 50-percent foreign ownership. The 
dependent variables are our measures of innovation (see Section 3 for details). Selection controls include lagged ln 
firm sales, lagged ln labor productivity, lagged sales growth, lagged export status, lagged average wage, lagged ln 
capital per employee, lagged ln capital. All columns include year fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered by 
firm. * indicates 10% significance; ** 5% significance; *** 1% significance.
Process Innovation
Assimilation of Foreign Technologies
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Panel A 1a 2a 3a 4a 5a
Lag Foreign 0.430*** 0.360** 0.297* 0.321** 0.416**





Observations 20722 20671 14656 12767 17578
R-squared 0.244 0.296 0.298 0.299 0.272
P-value of test Lag Foreign = Forward Foreign 0.0541
Panel B 1b 2b 3b 4b 5b
Lag Foreign 0.0273 -0.0126 0.0429 0.0346 -0.0193





Observations 20722 20671 14656 12767 17578
R-squared 0.346 0.368 0.368 0.370 0.382
P-value of test Lag Foreign = Forward Foreign 0.610
Panel C 1c 2c 3c 4c 5c
Lag Foreign 0.117 0.0710 0.0481 0.0554 0.214**





Observations 20722 20671 14656 12767 17578
R-squared 0.146 0.186 0.178 0.178 0.163
P-value of test Lag Foreign = Forward Foreign 0.669
Firm FEs yes yes yes yes yes
Industry trends yes yes yes
Selection controls yes yes
Propensity score weighting yes
New Methods of Organizing Production
Notes: Foreign is an indicator variable that equals one if the firm has at least 50-percent foreign ownership.  The 
dependent variables are our measures of innovation (see Section 3 for details). Selection controls include lagged ln 
firm sales, lagged ln labor productivity, lagged sales growth, lagged export status, lagged average wage, lagged log 
capital per employee, lagged log capital. All columns include year fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered by 
firm. * indicates 10% significance; ** 5% significance; *** 1% significance.
Table 4. Foreign Ownership and Innovation: New Machines and New Methods of Organizing 
Production

























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Panel A 1a 2a 3a 4a 5a
Lag Foreign 0.0422*** 0.0422*** 0.0403** 0.0400** 0.0666***





Observations 20630 20630 14658 12767 17550
R-squared 0.041 0.053 0.047 0.052 0.081
P-value of test Lag Foreign = Forward Foreign 0.0605
Panel B 1b 2b 3b 4b 5b
Lag Foreign 0.201* 0.204* 0.174 0.243* 0.333*





Observations 10907 10907 8020 7026 10058
R-squared 0.111 0.124 0.130 0.133 0.164
P-value of test Lag Foreign = Forward Foreign 0.266
Panel C 1c 2c 3c 4c 5c
Lag Foreign 0.0238 0.0274* 0.0263 0.0312 0.0360





Observations 20667 20667 14660 12771 17574
R-squared 0.211 0.215 0.209 0.204 0.245
P-value of test Lag Foreign = Forward Foreign 0.221
Firm FEs yes yes yes yes yes
Industry trends yes yes yes
Selection controls yes yes
Propensity score weighting yes
Notes: Foreign is an indicator variable that equals one if the firm has at least 50-percent foreign ownership.  
Exports/Sales is the share of exports over total sales. Ln Exports is the natural logarithm of real exports. Ln 
Average wage is the natural logarithm of the real total wage bill per worker. Selection controls include lagged ln 
firm sales, lagged ln labor productivity, lagged sales growth, lagged export status (dropped for Exports/Sales and 
Ln Exports), lagged average wage (dropped for Ln Average wage), lagged log capital per employee, lagged log 
capital. All columns include year fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered by firm. * indicates 10% significance; 
** 5% significance; *** 1% significance.





Panel A 1a 2a 3a 4a 5a 6a
Lag Foreign 2.042*** 0.165*** 0.120** 0.112* 0.0700* 0.182***





Observations 20671 20671 20671 16867 14760 17578
R-squared 0.169 0.100 0.147 0.275 0.284 0.130
P-value of test Lag Foreign = Forward Foreign 0.211
Panel B 1b 2b 3b 4b 5b 6b
Lag Foreign 0.367*** 0.126*** 0.109** 0.0877 0.109** 0.114**





Observations 20359 20359 20359 16639 14567 17338
R-squared 0.185 0.014 0.031 0.029 0.035 0.016
P-value of test Lag Foreign = Forward Foreign 0.0119
Firm FEs yes yes yes yes yes
Industry FEs yes
Industry trends yes yes yes
Selection controls yes yes
Propensity score weighting yes
Notes: Foreign is an indicator variable that equals one if the firm has at least 50-percent foreign ownership.   Ln Sales is the 
natural logarithm of the firm's real sales. Ln Labor productivity is the natural logarithm of real value added per worker. 
Selection controls include lagged export status, lagged average wage, lagged log capital per employee, lagged log capital. All 
columns include year fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered by firm. * indicates 10% significance; ** 5% significance; *** 
1% significance.




1 2 3 4 5 6
Lag Foreign (t-1) 0.119*** 0.195*** 0.0363 0.0907 0.0731* 0.148***
(0.0460) (0.0638) (0.0411) (0.0632) (0.0376) (0.0504)
2 Lag Foreign (t-2) 0.124** 0.168*** 0.0228 0.0355 0.103** 0.124**
(0.0499) (0.0617) (0.0425) (0.0566) (0.0409) (0.0507)
3 Lag Foreign (t-3) 0.0938** 0.0678 0.100** 0.0909* 0.0934** 0.0869*
(0.0412) (0.0524) (0.0400) (0.0521) (0.0371) (0.0489)
Foreign (t) 0.0703 -0.0129 0.0818*
(0.0642) (0.0589) (0.0450)
Forward Foreign (t+1) 0.0659 0.0358 0.0732*
(0.0585) (0.0510) (0.0421)
2 Forward Foreign (t+2) 0.0341 -0.0247 0.0484
(0.0467) (0.0475) (0.0377)
Observations 12,555 9,292 12,555 9,292 12,555 9,292
R-squared 0.038 0.037 0.048 0.050 0.033 0.034
Industry trends yes yes yes yes yes yes
Selection controls yes yes yes yes yes yes
Notes: All specifications are in first-differences. Foreign is an indicator variable that equals one if the firm has at least 
50-percent foreign ownership in that year. The lags and leads of Foreign reflect the ownership indicator in different time 
periods. The dependent variables are our measures of innovation (see Section 3 for details). Selection controls include 
lagged ln firm sales, lagged ln labor productivity, lagged sales growth, lagged export status, lagged average wage, 
lagged ln capital per employee, lagged ln capital. All columns include year fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered 
by firm. * indicates 10% significance; ** 5% significance; *** 1% significance.
Appendix Table A1. Foreign Ownership and Innovation: First Differences Specification
Both (new machines and 
























Notes: Variable definitions are given as in the 2002 questionnaire, which is available at ftp://ftp.funep.es/ESEE/pet_extr/c-esee02.pdf. Firms are asked the same 
questions in other years.
Question wording (highlighted as in the original questionnaire)


















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Ln Value Added Ln Value Added Ln Value Added
(1) (2) (3)
Ln Capital 0.102*** 0.116*** 0.116***
(0.0131) (0.0127) (0.0231)






Assimilation of Foreign Technologies 0.0975***
(0.0270)
Firm FEs yes yes yes
Observations 19529 19529 5170
R-squared 0.261 0.258 0.292





Lag ln sales 0.240*** 0.180**
(0.0245) (0.0906)
Lag labor productivity 0.260*** -0.0987
(0.0619) (0.0840)
Lag Sales growth -0.0990 -0.185
(0.117) (0.149)
Lag export status 0.498*** 0.109
(0.0889) (0.108)
Lag average wage 6.20e-07 1.27e-07
(3.77e-07) (6.06e-07)
Lag Innovation 0.221*** 0.0717
(0.0752) (0.0953)
Lag Stock of Innovation 0.0171 -0.0336*
(0.0132) (0.0200)
Lag ln capital 0.215*** 0.0537
(0.0217) (0.0938)




Industry FEs yes yes
Observations 15417 15417
Pseudo R-squared 0.151
Column 1 presents univariate probit regressions of the Foreign ownership dummy on the set of 
lagged variables used in the propensity score estimation, on all industries pooled (for the 
results shown in the paper, we estimate the propensity score by industry, to allow for different 
coefficients on the included variables). Column 2 presents the multivariate probit regression 
using the same variables, on all industries pooled. All regressions include industry dummies. 
The right-hand side variables are highly correlated, so that when we run the multivariate 
regression, many of them become insignificant. Note that lagged firm sales is the most 
significant determinant, consistent with our model. In the paper, the propensity score weights 
are obtained by estimating the multivariate regression for each industry separately. All 
regressors are balanced in all industries using the set of covariates in Column 2. When we used 
a more parsimonious specification, with fewer variables, some of the regressors were not 
balanced across blocks in some industries. These results are shown in Table S5, for a simpler 
specification of the propensity score.
Table S4: Probit model for propensity score estimation
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Process Innovation Product Innovation Assimilation of Foreign Technologies
Corresponding Col in Paper Table 3 Col 5a Table 3 Col 5b Table 3 Col 5c
Lag Foreign 0.473** 0.142 0.0867
(0.194) (0.207) (0.0577)
Observations 20545 20545 5406
R-squared 0.523 0.392 0.177
Both New Machines New Organization
Table 4 Col 5a Table 4 Col 5b Table 4 Col 5c
Lag Foreign 0.353** -0.105 0.225**
(0.154) (0.0927) (0.104)
Observations 20545 20545 20545
R-squared 0.266 0.372 0.153
Exports/Sales ln Exports ln Average wage
Table 7 Col 5a Table 7 Col 5b Table 7 Col 5c
Lag Foreign 0.0356 0.162 0.0426*
(0.0252) (0.178) (0.0250)
Observations 20506 10808 20541
R-squared 0.066 0.140 0.240
ln Sales ln Labor Productivity
Table 8 Col 6a Table 8 Col 6b




Firm FEs yes yes yes
Propensity score weighting yes yes yes
This table re-estimates the propensity score regressions in the paper, using a parsimonious 
specification for the propensity score that includes only Lagged firm sales, Lagged labor 
productivity and year as controls when calculating the score. The score is again calculated by 
industry, to allow for differences across industries in the coefficients. In this case, the covariates 
are not balanced in some industries and blocks, which is why we chose a richer specification for 
the paper, where all covariates are balanced. However, as the table shows, the results are fairly 
robust when using this simpler specification for the score.
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This paper uses a unique panel dataset to establish a causal relationship between the use 
of flexible contractual arrangements with labor and capital structure of the firm. Using the 
exogenous inter-temporal variation from government subsidies, I find that hiring more 
temporary workers leads firms to have more debt. Since temporary workers, unlike permanent 
ones, can be fired at a much lower cost during their contract duration, or their contracts may be 
not extended upon expiration, a firm can more easily meet its interest payments and avoid 
bankruptcy when faced with a negative shock. I interpret this result as evidence of flexible 
workforce decreasing operating leverage which, in turn, promotes financial leverage. The 
economic magnitude of the effect is large. A thought experiment of completely prohibiting an 
average firm from offering temporary employment contracts would suggest that it should reduce 
its debt level by 4.9 percentage points, which is about 8% of the average debt level across firms. 
Given the overwhelming extent of labor reforms in continental Europe in recent years that touch 
upon the incentives to use different employment contracts and are aimed at offering more job 
security to workers, it is important to understand how such policies would affect firms. 
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This paper studies how a rms composition of contractual arrangements with its factors of
production a¤ects its capital structure. In an uncertain environment the option to adjust
input costs after shocks have realized has value. Therefore, when a rm uses more exible
contract arrangements with its capital and labor, it has a higher ability to convert some
of its xed operating costs into variable costs and decrease the operating leverage ex post.
The optimal level of overall risk that a rm is willing to tolerate denes the total amount of
xed costs that its variable cash ow can potentially cover, so that operating and nancial
leverage are substitutes (Mandelker and Rhee, 1984). Since the use of exible contracting
with factors of production reduces operating leverage, it should also be positively related to
nancial leverage.
This paper uses a unique panel dataset of manufacturing rms to establish the causal
e¤ect of a rms use of di¤erent types of employment contracts on its capital structure.
Importantly, it builds the identication strategy on the exogenous inter-temporal varia-
tion in the introduction of government subsidies that promoted one type of contractual
arrangement (permanent employment contracts) at the expense of the other, more exible
one (temporary employment contracts). The di¤erential implementation of these subsidies
across regions, years, and types of workers allows me to identify this causal relationship in a
quasi-experimental setting. To the best of my knowledge this is the rst paper that measures
the composition of employment contracts at the rm level, as well as provides evidence of
its causal e¤ect on capital structure.
The economic magnitude of this causal e¤ect is quite large. A thought experiment of
completely prohibiting an average rm from o¤ering temporary employment contracts would
suggest that such a rm should reduce its debt level by 4.9 percentage points, which is about
8% of the average debt level across rms. Given the overwhelming extent of labor reforms in
continental Europe in recent years that touch upon the incentives to use di¤erent employment
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contracts and are aimed at o¤ering more job security to workers, it is important to understand
how such policies would a¤ect rms. If rms cannot hire the optimal number of temporary
employees, they may be forced to reduce the levels of debt nancing to suboptimal ones,
which can potentially a¤ect their long-run growth and survival.1
The high levels of temporary employment may also explain why rms in some countries
have higher levels of debt than in others. Figure 1 plots the relationship between average
rm leverage ratio and the proportion of workers on temporary contracts for European
countries.2 Based on this preliminary motivating evidence, it can be seen, for example,
that approximately one sixth of the di¤erence in average debt nancing between countries
like Germany and the U.K or three quarters of the di¤erence between Finland and Spain is
associated with the di¤erence in their employment practices.
Although the mechanism described in this paper can be applied to various factors of
production, it is harder to nd a source of exogeneous variation in the exibility of capital
or technology itself to provide a causal evidence. It is also more natural to illustrate it
in terms of labor, because for this factor of production there naturally exist two types of
employment contracts that di¤er dramatically in terms of the employment exibilty they
provide  temporary contracts and permanent contracts. The main distinct feature of a
temporary contract, which is particularly relevant for capital structure decisions, is a much
lower ring cost as compared to a permanent contract. In the context of this paper, it
is exactly the di¤erence in ring costs across the two classes of contracts that matters for
the choice of capital structure. Hiring workers under temporary contracts, as opposed to
1A large literature has explored the impact of labor policies (typically related to unionization), on rms
real decisions and outcomes, such as protability and market values (Ruback and Zimmerman, 1984, Abowd,
1989, and Hirsch, 1991), cost of equity (Chen, Kacperczyk and Ortiz-Molina, 2009), innovation (Acharya,
Baghai and Subramanian, 2010). Besley and Burgess (2004) also investigate how pro-worker regulation
is related to investment and economic growth. My paper, in constrast, looks at the e¤ect of temporary
employment per se, rather than that of the union-level bargaining.
2This gure is based on the rm-level data from Amadeus largest rms database and the country-level
data from OECD.StatExtracts, for 1997-2010. The blue line plots the corresponding linear t. The cross-
country regression estimates are very similar to the causal IV estimates obtained in the main body of the
paper.
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permanent ones, allows rms to adjust their labor force, and hence labor costs, and prot
or project returns faster and more cheaply when responding to idiosyncratic shocks. For
example, upon a realization of an adverse shock to their cash ows or business conditions in
general, rms may easily re some of the workers on temporary contracts and still be able
to meet their debt obligations.3
More precisely, when a negative shock occurs, workers become less productive in general,
so that absent ring costs it may be optimal to reduce employment and save on xed labor
costs (wages). In the presence of large ring costs, however, rms may choose to hoard labor
to save on the ring costs, instead. The two types of employment contract illustrate these
two possibilities. When workers are hired under a temporary arrangement, they do not have
to be kept in place when negative shocks realize, since there is practically no ring cost
associated with this type of contract. The employment exibility provided by temporary
employment e¤ectively reduces the ex post variability of rms cash ow, and decreases the
probability of bankruptcy for any given level of debt servicing obligations, which are a xed
expense. A lower bankruptcy probability enhances the debt capacity of rms and enables
them to support a higher level of debt that may be otherwise advantageous due to di¤erent
considerations, such as the tax shield it provides (DeAngelo and Masulis, 1980), a reduction
in the free cash ow that is available for overinvestment by managers as in Stulz (1990), etc.
This mechanism may be further interpreted as a substitution between operating and
nancial leverage. Flexible temporary employment decreases the operating leverage of the
rm by making the labor cost more variable, thereby increasing the capacity of the rm to
bear xed costs and promoting nancial leverage, while sustaining the same level of risk.4
3Fired workers are still paid the wages for the work already accomplished. However, there is no obligation
to keep them further employed and pay future wages.
4For the operating vs nancial leverage story to work it must be the case that wages are senior to debt
repayments, since otherwise they can be abandoned when bankruptcy becomes a concern, so that hiring
temporary vs permanent workers does not make a di¤erence in terms of shifting the bankruptcy threshold.
Indeed, in Spain, which is the country which I study in my empirical analysis, wages are senior claims to
non-collaterized debt.
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Indeed, I nd empirical evidence for such a substitution. When rms employment struc-
ture is more exible, i.e. it hires more temporary workers, it also uses more debt nancing.
This result is robust to accounting for unobserved time-invariant rm heterogeneity, rm-
level controls, and macroeconomic e¤ects. Furthermore, the use of an exogenous shock
resulting from a government program promoting less exible permanent employment at the
expense of a more exible temporary one, enables me to interpret the relationship between
employment exibility and capital structure as a causal one. To the best of my knowledge,
this is the rst paper to provide evidence of a causal relationship between employment ex-
ibility and debt nancing. In my empirical analysis I further discuss how my results are
robust to alternative stories.
One may ask why rms can ever nd it optimal to hire workers under permanent con-
tracts, given the increased exibility that comes with temporary employment and the obser-
vation that temporary employees (especially those hired under a particular type of temporary
contract xed-term employment contract) often perform the same job within a rm as per-
manent employees (Jimeno and Toharia, 1994, for Spain the country with one of the highest
levels of temporary employment). The research on job security and worker productivity has
shown that workers hired under temporary contracts may pose hidden costs on the rm,
for example have more job accidents (Guadalupe, 2003) or be less productive in general (as
modeled by Blanchard and Landier, 2002, and Caggese and Cuenat, 2008). Hence, the benet
of a temporary employee in terms of giving rms the exibility in bad states of the world
may come at a cost of producing less in good states of the world.
In the light of a potentially lower productivity of temporary workers, it is interesting
to explore for which rms the value of temporary employees is higher. One may think of
temporary employment contract as embedding an option to re workers, where the price of
that option comes from their lower productivity. Intuitively, such option should be most
valuable for rms for which bankruptcy cost is higher, for example for rms with a low
liquidation value of assets. These rms can benet most from temporary employees in terms
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of relaxing the implicit borrowing constraint and enabling them to support a higher level
of debt. Indeed, consistent with this logic my empirical results suggest that the positive
relationship between exible employment and debt nancing is mostly pronounced within
rms with low liquidation value of assets.
A dual labor market consisting of workers characterized by di¤erent degrees of job se-
curity exists in virtually all countries, either informally (with "under-the-table" payments)
or formally (with di¤erential legal contract arrangements with employees). One particular
country that provides an excellent opportunity to study the e¤ects of employment exibility
on nancing decisions of rms, is Spain. Not only it has a formal dual market with an ex-
traordinary level of temporary employment (24% of all salaried workers as of 20105), which
has been the highest among the OECD countries (OECD, 2002), but the di¤erence in ring
costs across the two types of contracts is quite dramatic.
When a temporary worker is dismissed (or when a xed-term contract worker is not
converted into a permanent one at the end of the three-year maximum tenure) a rm pays
only up to 12 dayswages in severance payments as opposed to up to 45 dayswages for
permanent workers (Jimeno and Toharia, 1994). Since both are per year of seniority, the
e¤ect is further amplied by the observation that a permanent worker is more likely to have
worked for a longer time in the rm (given the three-year legal limit for workers on xed-term
and apprenticeship contracts and the short nature of contracts for temporary jobs), hence the
cost di¤erential in absolute terms is even bigger. Moreover, ring a permanent worker may
involve a court procedure with substantial administrative costs, while a temporary worker
does not have the right to sue her employer for dismissal. Finally, a rm may simply choose
not to prolong the xed-term contract upon expiration and anecdotal evidence suggests that
xed-term contracts with some employees are renewed every week. In this case employment
and total wage bill for the next period can be adjusted at zero cost almost immediately.
5Encuesta de Población Activa 2010 (Economically Active Population Survey), conducted quarterly by
the National Institute of Statistics (INE).
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The origin of such a dual labor market in Spain lies in the 1984 reform which recognized
the need for exibility in the labor market by largely extending the applicability of temporary
employment contracts. As a result, their use quickly rose up to 35% in 19956. Empirical
evidence for some of the European countries7 suggests that such dualism in the labor market
may have negative e¤ects on the economy. Indeed in the late 1990s the Spanish government
partially reversed the employment liberalization policy by introducing subsidies to rms for
converting existing temporary workers into permanent employees and for hiring new workers
on permanent contracts. Because these subsidies were implemented di¤erentially across
regions, years and had di¤erent eligibility criteria for workers, this institutional framework
gives an opportunity to study the causal e¤ect of a rms composition of labor contracts on
its nancing decisions. At the same time I am able to use the panel structure of the dataset
to control for any unobserved time-invariant characteristics of the rm that may inuence
its nancing policy. The combination of these identication strategies allows me to evaluate
the causal e¤ect of a rms use of temporary employment contracts on its capital structure
in a quasi-experimental setting. This e¤ect is economically large and suggests that labor
policy has signicant implications on capital structure of rms.
My paper also relates to the research on the interactions between corporate nance and
labor economics that has recently attracted some attention (see a survey by Pagano and
Volpin, 2008). Firms may choose more conservative nancial policies in order to mitigate
the workersexposure to unemployment risk (Agrawal and Matsa, 2010), or in order to induce
employees to invest more in rm-specic capital which would be lost in case of bankruptcy
(Butt Jaggia and Thakor, 1994, and Berk, Stanton and Zechner, 2010). One particular
question that has been explored in the labor-nance literature is the strategic e¤ect of debt
nancing when workers are unionized (Perotti and Spier, 1993; Matsa, 2010; Simintzi, Vig
6Encuesta de Población Activa 1995.
7Blanchard and Landier (2002) for France; a survey by Dolado, García-Serrano and Jimeno (2002) for
Spain.
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and Volpin, 2010), suggesting that a rmmay ex ante choose the level of debt in such a way as
to preclude workers from bargaining over their wage ex post. In contrast to these bargaining
models, in my model exibility comes from the type of employment contract o¤ered, rather
than from rms facing less unionized labor. I believe that my empirical setup allows to
illustrate the importance of labor contract type per se for capital structure decisions, by
ltering out potential bargaining e¤ects due to the special bargaining environment in Spain,
and hence provides for a di¤erent causal relationship. The contribution of my paper is thus
to give evidence of a new mechanism a¤ecting capital structure decisions of rms the use of
more exible contractual arrangements with the labor force, and potentially more generally
with other factors of production.
Finally, my paper contributes to the empirical literature examining the relation between
various real exibilities and nancial structure. Mauer and Triantis (1994) use numerical
analysis to suggest that production exibilities of rms can enhance their debt capacity.
Petersen (1994) examines the role of operating leverage in the rms pension choice. In
particular, he nds that the probability of a rm choosing a more exible dened contribution
plan, rather than a less exible dened benet plan, is higher on average for rms with more
variable cash ows. He interprets this result as rms e¤ectively reducing their operating
leverage by selecting a dened contribution plan, which can also be related to nancial
leverage. Hanka (1998) explores employment decisions in U.S. rms and nds that having
more debt is correlated with reducing rm employment more heavily and relying more on
part-time labor force. His conjecture is that this may be due to higher incentives of rms to
make labor costs variable rather than xed. MacKay (2003) shows that investment exibility
in workforce, estimated by the ratio of actual to shadow rents of the workforce input, is
positively associated with leverage ratios. In contrast to these papers, I can directly observe
the employment exibilty at the rm level, as measured by the composition of di¤erent
employment contracts, and use an exogenous shock to such a composition to establish a
causal e¤ect of rm employment exibility on capital structure.
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The rest of the paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 describes the data and denes the
variables; Section 3 presents the empirical strategy and main results; Section 4 provides
additional evidence and discusses the results of the paper in the light of other theories;
Section 5 concludes.
2 Data Description and Variables Denition
The main results in this paper are based on three sets of data. I combine rm-level data with
the regional data on subsidies to promote permanent employment contracts, with industry-
level data on the composition of workforce.
The rm-level data come from the Encuesta sobre Estrategias Empresariales (ESEE),
spanning the years from 1994 to 2006. This is a panel dataset of Spanish manufacturing rms
collected by the Fundación SEPI (a non-government organization) and the Spanish Ministry
of Industry. It is designed to be representative of the population of Spanish manufacturing
rms and includes on average 1,700 rms per year. The response rate in the survey is 80%
to 100% across years and, when rms disappear over time due to attrition, new rms are
re-sampled to ensure the panel remains representative.8
This is also a unique dataset in that it contains information on both private and public
rms. 14% of rms that enter the data with more than 200 employees will at some point
trade on an exchange. Among smaller rms this percentage is less than 1%. Firms in the
sample represent all 17 regions (autonomous communities) and 2-digit NACE industries.
Following the literature, I use Total Debt / Total Assets as a measure of leverage. Total
Debt is dened as the sum of short-term and long-term liabilities, Total Assets is the book
value of assets, also equal to the sum of Total Debt and Book Equity. As reported in Table
1, around 57% of rm nancing comes from debt. Although the survey is anonymous and
8Details on the survey characteristics and data access guidelines can be obtained at
http://www.funep.es/esee/sp/sinfo_que_es.asp.
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the data cannot be matched to market values, this does not pose a problem given that the
vast majority of rms are private and such data would not exist by denition.
These data also contain information on the total number of employees and, remarkably,
on the proportion of workers on temporary contracts (both measured at the end of the year),
which allows me to measure the exibility of employment contracts at the rm level across
years. 269 employees work in an average rm, and 24% of them have temporary contracts in
the year the rm enters the data (this percentage is lower in later years, in particular due to
the subsidies promoting permanent employment implemented by the government). Firm size,
measured as the natural logarithm of rms real sales, is equal to 16, which corresponds to
approximately 8.8mln 2006 Euros. On average, 72% of rms assets are tangible, as measured
by property, plant and equipment minus depreciation and amortization over property, plant
and equipment plus intangible and nancial assets minus depreciation and amortization.9
Average protability, measured by rms operating prot margin (which is dened as the
ratio of sales net of purchases and labor expenses to sales), is equal to 23%. To proxy for
growth opportunities I also measure research and development intensity dened as the ratio
of R&D expenditures over sales. These variables are typically found to be determinants of
capital structure choice (Titman andWessels, 1988) and will be used as rm control variables
in the analysis.
All rms report the location of their industrial plants (85% of rms have just one plant;
additional 6% of rms have two or more plants with the two main plants in the same region).
Hence, I am able to merge the rm-level data with the data on regional subsidies promoting
permanent employment. For rms with more than one plant I merge at the region of the main
plant. These subsidies (García Pérez and Rebollo Sanz, 2009) were implemented di¤erentially
in various regions of the country. In particular, the time of implementation was di¤erent:
9Unfortunately, the data on the asset side of the balance sheet is not as detailed. The survey only records
total value of depreciation and amortization. Given that xed assets generally depreciate more, I have
allocated total depreciation and amortization to property, plant and equipment. The results are robust to
allocating it proportionally to gross tangible and intangible assets.
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some regions introduced them in 1997 onwards, some only in certain years, while Catalonia
did not introduce any regional-level subsidies during our sample period. Moreover, there
is a considerable variation across regions and years in the amount of the subsidy (ranging
from 1653 Euros per eligible employee in Baleares in 2000-2001 to more than 15000 Euros
in Madrid in 2002), as well as the eligibility criteria by gender, age and other characteristics
of employees. The maximum statutory amounts of subsidies introduced in di¤erent regions
and years are summarized by gender in Table 210.
Finally, I use the data on intensities of the use of female and male employees in di¤erent
manufacturing industries, as provided by the Encuesta de Población Activa, and merge them
to the rm-level data. These gender intensities, measured as of the 4th quarter of 1993, are
listed in Table 3.
3 Estimation Strategy and Main Results
In this section I provide the details of my estimation strategy and results. Before turning
to the formal analysis, I rst use the ESEE dataset to explore the relationship between the
proportion of temporary employees and capital structure graphically. Figure 2 plots the
averages of the two variables across di¤erent industries for the period from 1994 to 2006. As
can be seen from this gure, the industries that employed larger proportions of temporary
workers, such as Leather and Footwear or Timber, were also characterized by higher ratios
of debt to assets than industries that employed relatively lower proportions of temporary
labor force, such as Chemicals or Beverages.
Figure 3 plots the time-series relationship between the two variables and again a positive
relationship can be deduced. One can notice a striking drop in the use of temporary labor
10Sometimes it was not clear what the maximum Euro value could be (e.g. Valencia in 1998-2000 o¤ered
subsidies as percentages of payroll tax). For these region-years I recorded a missing value. I also did a
robustness check imputing values from total wage bill information that I have and the results were similar.
Given that such imputation has to rely on additional assumptions, I opted to exclude such region-years from
the main analysis.
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force starting approximately in 1997. One of the possible explanations for this drop is the
country-wide implementation of subsidies promoting permanent employment at the expense
of the temporary one, which I further describe in Section 3.2 and use it to construct an
instrumental variable. Interestingly, however, the drop in temporary employment was also
accompanied by a fall in average debt to assets ratio.
Obviously, there may be various unobserved characteristics of industries or common
macroeconomic factors that may show up as a positive relationship between temporary labor
force and debt nancing either across industries or across years. Therefore, I now turn to a
more systematic rm-level analysis by employing the panel structure of the dataset and the
exogenous variation arising from government labor programs to estimate the causal e¤ect
of the use of temporary employment contracts on capital structure, using xed-e¤ects and
instrumental variable approaches.
3.1 Fixed-E¤ects Estimation
First, I estimate the e¤ect of the use of temporary employment contracts on capital structure
using the following specication:
Dit = t + Tempit 1 + Xit 2 + i + it (1)
where Dit is the ratio of total debt to assets, t are the year xed-e¤ects, Tempit 1 is the
proportion of temporary workers in the prior year11, Xit 2 are rm-level control variables
(size, tangibility, protability and R&D expenditures, taken with a two-period lag12 ), and
11I have allowed for a one year lag in the independent variable, because it may take time for the rm to
change its capital structure policy upon changes in employment policy, since these decisions are likely to be
made by di¤erent divisions of the company. Empirically contemporaneous and lagged values of Temp are
correlated, and the results are qualitatively similar to using contemporaneous values.
12For all my results I provide specications with and without rm-level controls. In specications with
controls I lag all covariates by two years in order to avoid the "bad control" problem if the right-hand side
variables are not truly exogenous and can themselves be outcome variables biasing the estimate of . I have
also checked that results are robust to using contemporaneous values of these controls.
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i are rm xed-e¤ects. Standard errors in all specications are two-way clustered at the
rm and region-year level (which provides conservative standard errors)13.
The panel structure of the dataset allows me to control for any intrinsic unobservable
di¤erences rms may have with respect to their capital structure (for example, whether
the rm has a more variable cash ow in general, whether it is a small business with a
distrust in credit and banking, or whether its tasks generally require more human capital
specicity), providing an opportunity to explore what drives within-rm changes in nancing
decisions. Including rm xed e¤ects allows me to control for any time-invariant observed and
unobserved heterogeneity across rms. The results of xed-e¤ects estimation are reported
in Table 414.
The coe¢ cient in column 1 means that a one percentage point change in the proportion of
workers on temporary contracts is associated with a 0.06 percentage points higher leverage
ratio. I have also calculated the average within-rm standard deviation of proportion of
temporary workers, which equals 0.11 in my data. Therefore, when a given rm changes its
proportion of temporary workers by 1 standard deviation, it also increases its leverage by
0.62 percentage points.
I do a series of robustness checks to rule out concerns of spurious correlation. For example,
column 2 reports results of a specication with region-year xed e¤ects. The results are
similar and one can be sure that the di¤erences in leverage ratios cannot be explained by
rms potentially having di¤erential access to credit over time driven by their location in
more or less credit-abundant regions. Moreover, if there is generally more pressure from the
society against ring workers in regions with higher unemployment rates and rms take more
conservative debt policities there, region-year xed e¤ects will also capture such di¤erences.
13The two-way clustered standard errors were obtained using the Scha¤er (2010) xtivreg2 command in
STATA.
14I provide the within R2 coe¢ cients in all specications, so that the t of the model can be interpreted
on top of what can be accounted by the rm xed e¤ect. The corresponding adjusted R2 (that include the
explanatory power of rm xed e¤ects) are above 74% in all specications.
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It may also be the case that rms in certain industries in certain regions have been able
to employ di¤erent proportions of temporary workers over time (due to e.g. trends in worker
migration)
and at the same time raised debt at better terms. To refute such concerns and provide a
more corroborative evidence, I include region-industry trend in column 3. Finally, to account
for possible di¤erences across industries in a exible time-series framework, I have also added
industry-year xed e¤ects to the specication (column 4). The identication becomes very
tight in this case and rests on within-rm variation in temporary employment that cannot
be explained by local region-year on industry-year attributes. The results are robust and
signicant at 1% signicance level.
Columns 5 to 8 replicate the above specications including rm-level control variables.
Both the magnitude and the signicance of the coe¢ cient of interest stay similar, so that the
observed di¤erences in debt ratios cannot be explained by rms changing their tangibility
or R&D expenditures over time, or growing and becoming more protable.15
Although theoretically it may be possible that workers self-select into the type of contract
depending on whether they are willing to invest in rm-specic capital which would be lost
in case of bankruptcy (this would also show up as a positive correlation between the two
variables of interest, consistent with the mechanisms outlined in Butt Jaggia and Thakor
(1994) and Berk, Stanton and Zechner (2010)), practically it is not the case. Obtaining a
permanent contract would be always preferred by the employee due to a higher wage and
job security. Furthermore, the lag structure of the specication also mitigates such reverse
causality concerns.
In general, however, rms may be subject to project substitution and risk-shifting prob-
lem. Given that temporary workers usually reect non-specialized labor, rms with more
15I have also tried including accumulated prots during the previous 3 years, since rms are likely to pay
out debt when they have had a positive shock to their cashow. The results were similar and I opted to
exclude this variable from the further analysis to keep more observations.
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temporary workers may be able to alter the nature of their operations and specic tasks to
be performed more easily. If rms employ temporary workers precisely in order to be able
to take riskier projects, then rm creditors should rationally expect such project substitu-
tion and supply less debt. This unobserved risk-shifting behavior would show up as OLS
coe¢ cient being biased downwards.
In addition, as Caggese and Cuenat (2008) point out, rms that are nancially constrained
may generate a "demand for exibility" and hire more temporary workers than rms that are
not nancially constrained. Then, if more nancially contrained rms cannot get funding
and are less levered, we may underestimate the true e¤ect of temporary employment on
capital structure. Therefore, it is important to use the exogenous variation in the proportion
of temporary workers in order to uncover the magnitude of the causal e¤ect of the use of
exible employment on debt nancing of the rm, i.e. to make rms change their workforce
compositions not due to potentially endogenous reasons, such as risk-shifting or nancial
constraints, but due to exogenous incentives, in my case provided by the government. Hence
I proceed with the instrumental variable estimation.
3.2 Instrumental Variable Approach
Since I am able to directly observe the proportion of workers on temporary contracts, I do
not have to rely on purely reduced form estimation (e.g. debt on employment laws), and
can use government subsidies to construct an instrumental variable16. In this respect, Spain
represents a unique opportunity to study the causal e¤ect of temporary contracts on capital
structure, because subsidies promoting permanent employment at the expense of temporary
employment were introduced di¤erentially in various regions of the country, depending on
workers exogenous characteristics (gender, age, etc). Hence, rms were a¤ected di¤eren-
16The reduced-form regression results (debt on subsidy), reported in Appendix Table 1, have predicted
coe¢ cient signs and are signicant at conventional levels in most specications. The estimates suggest that
a 1000 Euro per-worker subsidy leads to 0.3-0.5 percentage point reduction in the debt to assets ratio.
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tially depending on both the amount of subsidy in its region and on how many eligible
temporary workers the rm had according to the regions criteria. To illustrate the source of
identication, lets consider, for example, a rm located in the Baleares autonomous region.
In 2000 such rm was eligible to get a one-time 1653 Euro subsidy for every female worker
it converted from temporary to permanent contract. But if the rm did not employ women,
this subsidy would not a¤ect its proportion of temporary workers. Moreover, the more el-
igible workers a rm had (women in this case), the bigger was the overall benet from the
subsidy, and hence the incentive to substitute temporary workers with permanent employees.
In other words, the more temporary workers the rm had originally, the lower would be the
e¤ect of a given level of subsidy on this rm and the lower the extent of the exogenous shift





wT0ig  Subsidygrt (2)
where Subsidygrt is the maximum statutory subsidy allowed by the government in region r in
year t for a worker of gender g 2 ffemale; maleg (as summarized in Table 2 under "Maximum
Subsidy"), and wT0ig is the rm-specic proportions of di¤erent types of temporary workers
(which is held constant at the year the rm enters the data to avoid any endogenous gender
substitution; that year is subsequently dropped from the estimation)18.
Ideally I would like to observe the rm-specic workforce composition by gender, however
the data allow me to see only the overall proportion of temporary workers (of both men and
17Autonomous regions introduced both subsidies for creating a new permanent contract and subsidies for
converting an existing temporary contract into a permanent contract. However, the two types of subsidies
were highly correlated and in many region-years identical. This makes me not di¤erentiate across these two
types of subsidies in my empirical analysis, so that I record one maximum subsidy value for each region-
year-gender (the maximum across the two if they are di¤erent).




where workers are also characterized by their age cohort a 2 fless than 25; 25 to 30; 30 to 40; 40 to 45; 45
to 50; above 50g. The results of the estimation were similar both qualitatively and quantitatively.
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women), which is already an improvement upon many available datasets. In order to over-
come this data limitation, I will use the industry-specic gender intensities (as summarized
in Table 3) to proxy for rm-specic gender intensities in hiring temporary workers. As
can be seen from Table 3, these industry-specic gender intensities provide a considerable
variation. For example, more than three quarters of all employees in the "Apparel" industry
are female, while only around 5% in the "Other transport equipment" industry. These ratios
are quite stable over time at the industry level, but in order to mitigate any endogeneity
concerns arising from the di¤erent eligibility criteria of subsidies and possible gender substi-
tution within a rm, in the empirical analysis they are kept xed at the pre-sample, 1993,
year. Furthermore, the possible intrinsic di¤erences in capital structures across industries,
when industries happen to have di¤erent eligibility criteria due to their gender composi-
tions, will be ltered out by the industry xed e¤ect (subsumed by the rm xed e¤ect in
all specications).
Hence I estimate equation (1), where I instrument the proportion of temporary workers






sg  Subsidygrt (3)
where w0sg is the industry-specic use of female and male employees, xed at the pre-sample
year (as summarized in Table 3), and wT0i is the rm-specic proportion of temporary workers
at the year it enters the data (that year is subsequently dropped from the estimation). I have
also deated the subsidy amount using the industry-level producer price index to express it in
real 2006 Euro amounts. This instrument hence calculates the actual total real Euro value of
subsidies that a given rm would receive if it converted its temporary workers into permanent
19In some regions the subsidy is received in the year of the actual conversion, while in others it reduces the
tax burden paid in the next year, hence there is no presumption on whether a lagged or contemporaneous
value should be used. The lagged value is the one that is more signicant in the reduced form estimation,
however.
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ones, per employee, and can be further described as an average wage bill reduction per
employee (as summarized in Table 2 under "Maximum Subsidy per Employee" this average
wage reduction on average amounted to 816 Euro). Although this variable implicitly assumes
that all eligible workers would be converted this does not have to be true in reality for the
instrument to work since we can also interpret it as as an intention-to-treat instrument. The
regional level variable, Subsidygrt, has been used in the literature on temporary employment
in other contexts to instrument the workers probability of being converted into a permanent
employee on the worker-level data (Fernández-Kranz et al., 2010, Barceló and Villanueva,
2010). To the best of my knowledge my paper is the rst one to construct the rm-specic
subsidy from the regional data and use it as an instrument for the overall use of temporary
contracts within a rm.
The results of the instrumental variable approach are presented in Table 5. It reports
the same specications as in the previous table and uses two-way clustering by rm and by
region-year to account for both within-rm correlation and within-region-year correlation
potentially arising from the same statutory subsidy amounts rms in general face in a given
region-year. The results of the rst stage are reported in Panel B. They suggest that a per-
worker subsidy of 1000 Euro incentivizes a rm to reduce its proportion of temporary workers
by 1.5 to 3.8 percentage points, depending on the specication. For each specication I also
report the weak identication Kleibergen and Paap (2006) F-test statistic which exceeds the
Stock and Yogo (2002) weak identication critical value for 5% maximal size distortion for 1
instrument and 1 endogenous regressor of 16.38 in all but one specications, suggesting that
my instrument is strong.20 21
20The critical value for 10% maximal size distortion for 1 instrument and 1 endogenous regressor of
8.96, which is exceeded in all specications. Stock and Yogo (2002) critical values are derived under the
assumption of homoskedasticity and no autocorrelation, so that their comparison to Kleibergen and Paap
(2006) F-statistic, which is robust to heteroskedasticity and within-cluster correlation, should be interpreted
with caution, as suggested by Baum, Scha¤er, and Stillman (2007).
21Adjusted R2 has no statistical meaning for the IV specications because a constant-only model of the
dependent variable is not nested within the two-stage least-squares model, and the residual sum of squares
is not constrained to be smaller than the total sum of squares. Hence, I do not report adjusted R2 for IV
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The coe¢ cient in column 1 (0.207) means that a 1 standard deviation increase in the
proportion of workers on temporary contracts leads to a 2.3 percentage points higher leverage
ratio. This result is economically and statistically signicant. In particular, such magnitude
suggests that prohibiting an average rm from hiring temporary employees (i.e. reducing its
proportion from 23.9% to 0%) would lead to a 4.9 percentage points reduction in debt level,
i.e. about 8% of the average.
An important question to consider is why regions introduced subsidies in di¤erent years
and in di¤erent amounts in the rst place. It may be thought that in regions where rms
had relatively more lobby power against converting cheaper temporary workers into more ex-
pensive permanent employees, the subsidies were introduced later and/or in bigger amounts.
In order to address this concern I estimate a specication with region-year xed e¤ects (col-
umn 2). Such setup allows me to control for any potentially endogenous regional government
choice based on the region characteristics in a given year. The coe¢ cient magnitude becomes
slightly smaller, but it is still statistically signicant at 5% level.
A similar argument may apply to the industry lobbying in di¤erent regions. Hence, I
saturate my specication by controlling for region-industry trends (column 3) as well as
industry-year xed e¤ects (column 4). The coe¢ cient of interest can still be identied
because even within the same industry and region and year a rm with a higher original
proportion of temporary workers can benet relatively more from the same statutory level
of subsidy per eligible temporary worker. Finally, I also include rm-level control variables.
The results are very similar. Although, the coe¢ cient in column 8 is only signicant at 15%
level, it can be mostly attributed to a relatively high standard error in the IV estimation,
because its magnitude is the same as in the one without controls (column 4). 22
specications.
22The coe¢ cient in column 8 is signicant at 10% level when using the specication with contemporaneous
instead of lagged2 controls (unreported).
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4 Mechanisms and Robustness Tests
The results in this paper provide evidence of a positive causal relationship between the use of
temporary employment contracts and nancial leverage. In this section I will discuss these
ndings in the light of several existing theories of the interaction between labor characteristics
and capital structure as well as provide additional results and robusness tests.
4.1 Liquidation Value Analysis
My intuition suggests that rms with higher bankruptcy costs should value the option to re
workers more and want to protect themselves from incurring these costs by hiring temporary
workers. Therefore, I would like to empirically examine whether there are di¤erential e¤ects
of having a exible workforce on capital structure driven by the magnitude of potential
bankruptcy costs. In order to do that I interact a measure of high liquidation value with
the proportion of temporary workers, both in xed-e¤ects and IV frameworks. I classify a
rm as having a high liquidation value if it has more buildings and land than the median
industry rm in the year it enters the data. The results of these regressions are presented in
Table 6.
Indeed, consistent with this intuition, the positive e¤ect of having a exible workforce
is pronounced mostly within low liquidation value rms. The IV estimates in columns 5
to 8 suggest that for rms with low liquidation value a 1 standard deviation increase in
the proportion of workers on temporary contracts leads to a 2.8 to 3.9 percentage points
higher leverage ratio, depending on the specication. The di¤erence between high and
low liquidation value rms is statistically and economically signicant. Although the point
estimate for high liquidation value rms is still positive, it is not statistically di¤erent from
zero (the 2-sided test statistics are reported for each specication). When bankruptcy is not
a concern, and the ring option embedded into temporary employment contract has a low
value, the relationship is supposed to be ambiguous, because of the counterbalancing e¤ect of
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a lower productivity. When exibility is not valuable enough, hiring temporary workers may
actually make rms take less debt because these workers are less productive and generate on
average a lower cash ow.23 Therefore, it is expected to nd a positive relationship between
employment exibilty and debt nancing only among the rms for which this exibility
matters, i.e. rms with a low liquidation value in my empirical setup.
It is also worth recalling that in a heterogeneous e¤ects framework IV identies a local
average treatment e¤ect which is a causal e¤ect for a subpopulation of rms most a¤ected by
the instrument. In my setup it is likely that the most constrained rms in terms of the lower
ability to convert temporary employees into permanent ones are those closest to bankruptcy,
for which a low liquidation value is a potential measure. Given that I nd a larger e¤ect for
these rms, this may provide for another reason why IV estimates are generally larger than
those from panel specications: the e¤ect of interest is larger for the most constrained rms,
i.e. those that convert temporary employees into permanent ones precisely because of the
subsidy.
4.2 The Role of Bargaining
It has been argued that debt can serve as a strategic tool to preclude bargaining over wage
in the context of unionized workers (Perotti and Spier, 1993; Matsa, 2010), so that a positive
relation between bargaining power and debt nancing is conjectured when debt is not rene-
gotiable. Moreover, a recent paper by Simintzi, Vig, and Volpin (2010) suggests that when
debt is renegotiable the opposite relation would obtain. I think the Spanish institutional
environment allows me to claim that the results are robust to the collective bargaining story
because its unique feature is that all workers irrespective of their contract type are covered by
collective bargaining agreements, and the agreement a given rm faces does not discriminate
23Such a dichotomy is also consistent with the logic of Caggese and Cuenat (2008), who model the opposing
e¤ects of rms "demand for exibility" and "demand for productivity". They study the e¤ect of nancial
constraints on exible employment, while I explore the causal relationship of exible employment on capital
structure.
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between workers based on their contract type.
Even if one thinks that the overall bargaining power of workers within a rm may be
dependent on the proportion of temporary workers, the agreements for 85% of rms in
manufacturing, and especially the smaller ones, are not at the rm level, but rather at
a more aggregated level (such as industry provincial or industry national, as reported by
Izquierdo et al., 2003). These agreements apply to all rms equally irrespective of whether
they participated in the actual bargaining process or not, and given that smaller rms which
I have in the sample are generally not in the core of the bargaining process, those agreements
are arguably exogenous for them.
The above feature of the Spanish institutional environment makes for another reason why
Spanish data are well-suited for studying the relationship between hiring temporary workers
and debt levels controlling for possible collective bargaining e¤ects. It does not, however,
imply the two theories are at odds, but rather that my story outlines another important
channel in the labor-nance relationship the one of employment contracts exibility. Sim-
intzi, Vig, and Volpin (2010) use the employment protection legislation indicator to show in
the reduced form estimation that in countries where it is more di¢ cult to re a worker rms
take less debt. They interpret this result as more bargaining power of workers potentially
arising from higher ring costs, is a¤ecting capital structure. My setup allows to provide
evidence that the di¤erence in ring costs per se a¤ects capital structure, where the mecha-
nism works through higher rms exibility on the operating leverage side and not through
workers demanding bigger concessions from the employer.
4.3 The Role of Cash
One important consideration to be analyzed is the observation that a subsidy promoting
permanent employment does not only inuence the composition of the labor force per se,
but also provides the rmwith a cash inow. Firms may potentially use this cash to raise even
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more debt or pay out existing debt. In this respect, the exclusion restriction of the instrument
would not be satised. Given that the estimated e¤ect of proportion of temporary workers
on debt levels is positive, we should be concerned only if cash from the subsidy is used to
pay out debt (this will bias the estimated e¤ect upwards; if cash is used to raise more debt
instead, then the estimated e¤ect is biased downwards, which means that the actual result
of the relationship between temporary workers and debt levels is even stronger).
Ideally, one could simply refute these concerns by looking at (Total Debt - Cash) / Total
Assets as the dependent variable. In this case, had it been a purely cash story, net debt
amount would not have changed in a situation when extra cash inow from subsidies was
used to pay out debt, and there would be no relationship between hiring temporary workers
and net debt levels. If instead we nd signicant results in such a regression, then it means
cash story cannot explain the ndings.
Unfortunately, ESEE does not contain a separate entry for cash and cash equivalents. To
mitigate this concern I do a back-of-the-envelope analysis of leverage ratios using Amadeus
data for Spain, which can be used to calculate both the total debt to assets ratio, as well
as the ratio of total debt less cash and cash equivalents to total assets.24 Figure 4 plots the
time-series evolution of these ratios for manufacturing rms in Spain. The rms in Amadeus
are largely comparable to those in ESEE and as can be noticed from this graph the evolution
of total debt to assets ratio closely resembles the one from Figure 3 which used ESEE data.
The main results of my paper suggest that this drop if overall leverage can be attributed
to the fall in temporary labor force across and within years, industries, and rms. Figure 4
also shows that the ratio of net debt to assets closely tracks the ratio of total debt to assets,
and also declined during the period of temporary workers conversion. This provides some
suggestive evidence for the robustness of the results of the paper to the cash story.
24The Amadeus data cannot be used for the main body of the analysis, since they lack the most important
variable percentage of temporary employees, which ESEE has. ESEE is an anonymous survey and the
attempts to try merging it to other datasets are explicitly prohibited by teh data collecting agency.
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Finally, I can also compare panel results in pre- and post-subsidies periods (given there
is no variation in the instrument during the pre-subsidies period, one can only compare
the xed-e¤ects specications25). If the result is driven by cash considerations, then the
coe¢ cient in the post-subsidies period (from 1997 onwards) should be higher than that in
the pre-subsidies period. Table 7 presents the results of such specications. The coe¢ cient
of interest is generally not statistically di¤erent across periods, and if anything it is actually
lower during the post-subsidies period (it is still positive and signicant though: 2-sided p-
values are reported for each specication). This provides additional corroborative evidence
against cash e¤ects26.
4.4 Survival Analysis
Finally, there is some suggestive evidence that the ability to adjust debt levels according to
the exibility of workforce composition may be related to the survival of the rm. First, I
explore the relationship between the probability of exiting the data in period t + 1 (due to
liquidation or switching to non-manufacturing activity), conditional on being alive in period
t, and the composition of the labor force. The results of these specications are reported in
Table 8. Column 1 to 4 report the results of the panel specications which suggest that hiring
more temporary workers is associated with a higher probability of survival, controlling for
any time-invariant rm-level characteristics. In particular, the magnitude of the coe¢ cient
suggests that a 1 standard deviation increase in the proportion of temporary workers is
associated with a 0.5% higher probability of survival. This magnitude is economically large,
given that the overall exit rate due to liquidation or switching to non-manufacturing activity
25I have also not included the lagged2 controls into this specication not to lose the data in the pre-
subsidies period. The results are robust to including contemporaneous controls, and are reported in columns
3 and 4.
26Given that in my main specication proportion of temporary workers enters with a lag, I also performed a
robustness check dening the post period from 1998 onwards. The results are qualitatively and quantitatively
the same.
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is about 7%. Columns 5 to 8 report the instrumental variable estimates. Their standard
errors are very high, but the magnitudes are similar or even larger than those of panel
estimates. The 2-sided p-values of these coe¢ cients range from 11% to 28%, so unfortunately
I may not convincingly say that there is a robust evidence with respect to the probability of
survival, using these specications.
Additionally, I can also examine some cross-sectional heterogeneity by comparing rms
who will exit the data by the end of the sample with rms that will survive by the end of the
sample. Columns 1 to 4 of Table 9 present panel results, while columns 5 to 8 employ the
instrumental variable approach. I observe that the relationship between leverage and exible
employment contracts is stronger for surviving rms. Moreover, although both survivors and
exiters did decrease their temporary labor force as a result of government subsidies27, only
survivors adjusted their leverage ratios according to the decreased labor force exibility.
However, these results should be interpreted with caution, since there can be unobserved
factors that a¤ect both the ability to adjust leverage and survival, so that it is harder to
motivate the exclusion restriction in this case, which may also shed light why the IV results
in Table 8 were not signicant. 28 Therefore, this evidence on the importance of the ability of
rms to accompany changes in employment contracts with corresponding changes in leverage
for rm survival in the long run can only be interpreted as suggestive.
5 Conclusion
This paper considers how a rms composition of contractual arrangements with its factors of
production a¤ects its capital structure. In particular, in the context of labor, the di¤erence in
ring costs across employment contracts provides for a di¤erent exibility, upon realization
27The unreported rst-stage results for IV specications show negative and signicant coe¢ cients for both
survivors and exiters.
28Notice, however, that if survival were related purely to higher liquidation value, then I should have
observed a lower e¤ect for surviving rms, rather than exiters. In contrast, the relationship is positive and
signicant only for survivors.
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of rm-specic shocks, and rms operating leverage. When rms face high potential bank-
ruptcy costs, rms that use more exible employment contracts are able to support higher
levels of nancial leverage, which can be benecial from tax shield or other considerations.
This mechanism provides an illustration of the substitution between operating and nancial
leverage when the overall amount of xed costs, both operating and the debt-related, denes
the overall risk of the rm given the variability of its cash ow.
I exploit the exogenous variation from government subsidies promoting the replacement
of temporary employees by permanent ones to construct an instrument for the rms use of
more exible, temporary, labor force. At the same time the panel structure of the dataset
allows me to control for any unobserved time-invariant characteristics of the rm that may
inuence its nancing policy. The combination of these identication strategies enables me
to evaluate the causal e¤ect of rms use of temporary employment contracts on its capital
structure in a quasi-experimental setting.
This e¤ect is economically large and is more prevalent among the low liquidation value
rms, for which bankruptcy is more of a concern. In particular, a thought experiment of
completely prohibiting an average rm from o¤ering temporary employment contracts would
suggest that such a rm should reduce its debt level by 4.9 percentage points, which is about
8% of the average debt level across rms. These empirical results suggest that labor policy
promoting more job security among workers and at the same time reducing the exibility
of rms employment has signicant implications for capital structure of rms, which is
important in the light of the ongoing labor reforms across European countries.
I complement my main analysis by exploring the relationship between exible employ-
ment and rm survival. There is some suggestive evidence that more exible temporary
employment is associated with a lower conditional probability of liquidation or switching to
a non-manufacturing activity. Additionally, by examining the relationship between capital
structure and temporary employment among rms that survive vs rms that exit by the end
of the sample, I nd that this relationship is ex post stronger for survivors. This evidence,
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although suggestive, opens up the directions for future research on the channels through
which temporary employment may a¤ect rmsreal decisions, long-run growth and survival,
an interesting question from the academic point of view, that would be especially important
from the policy perspective.
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Figures and Tables 
 
Figure 1  
 
 
Note: This figure plots the relationship between leverage (defined as the average firm-level ratio of total 
debt to assets, computed across manufacturing firms from Amadeus largest firms database for each 
country-year pair) and the country share of temporary employees (averages across years at the country 
level; obtained from OECD Statistical Database). The time period covers 1997-2010 and excludes all 
country-year observations when fewer than 50 firms were used to compute the average. The blue line 












Figure 2  
 
 
Note: This figure plots the relationship between firm-level leverage (defined as the ratio of total debt to 
assets) and firm-level share of temporary employees, computed for different industries across all firm-





Note: This figure plots the relationship between firm-level leverage (defined as the ratio of total debt to 






Note: This figure plots the time-series evolution of leverage ratios (defined as the average firm-level ratio 
of total debt to assets and total debt less cash and cash equivalents to assets), computed across 
manufacturing firms from Amadeus largest firms database for Spain. The time period covers 1994-2006 
to match the span of the ESEE data. 
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Variable Mean Std. deviation N
Capital Structure:
Total Assets 57.7mln 255mln 18365
Total Debt / Total Assets 0.571 0.230 18365
Employment:
Total Employment 269 783 18365
Temp 0.174 0.210 18365
Temp0 0.237 0.250 18364
Subsidies:
Maximum Subsidy 3523 4011 17488
Maximum Subsidy per Employee 816 1538 17488
Control Variables:
Size 16.013 2.014 18347
Tangibility 0.718 0.355 18124
Profitability 0.225 0.134 18346
R&D 0.007 0.017 18246
Table 1. Descriptive Statistics
Notes: The sample includes all firms in the ESEE (1994-2006). Total Assets is book value of total assets of 
the firm. Total Debt / Total Assets is the ratio of total debt (which is the sum of short-term and long-term 
liabilities) to total assets. Total Employment is firm's total employment at the end of the year. Temp is the 
ratio of workers on temporary contracts relative to total employment. Temp0 is the ratio of workers on 
temporary contracts relative to total employment in the first year the firm is in the data. Maximum Subsidy 
and Maximum Subsidy per Employee are the maximum subsidy amounts a firm is eligible to receive (defined 
in Section 2), in 2006 Euros. Size is the natural logarithm of firm's real sales, in 2006 Euros. All amounts are 
deflated using the industry-level producer price index  – Indice de Precios Industriales. Tangibility is the ratio 
of property, plant and equipment minus depreciation and amortization over property, plant and equipment 
plus intangible and financial assets minus depreaciation and amortization. Profitability is the operating profit 
margin of the firm, which is defined as the ratio of sales net of purchases and labor expenses to sales. R&D is 









































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Total Men Women % women
Total in manufacturing 2 105.4 1 638.4 466.9 28.5%
Food and beverages 331.1 242.7 88.4 26.7%
Tabacco 9.4 5 4.4 46.8%
Textiles 105.4 62.1 43.3 41.1%
Apparel 119.2 29.8 89.5 75.1%
Leather and Footwear 64 43.2 20.8 32.5%
Timber 59 54.1 4.9 8.3%
Paper 39.6 32.4 7.1 17.9%
Printing and publishing 113.4 82.7 30.7 27.1%
Petroleum refinery* 12.2 10.6 1.6 13.1%
Chemicals 128.4 93.9 34.5 26.9%
Plastic and rubber products 82.1 68.3 13.8 16.8%
Other nonmetal mineral products 140.6 124.5 16.1 11.5%
Basic metal products 99.4 92.1 7.3 7.3%
Fabricated metal products 169.8 156.2 13.6 8.0%
Industrial and agricultural equipment 130.8 120.2 10.6 8.1%
Office machinery 12.3 9.4 2.9 23.6%
Electric materials and equipment 59.7 44.6 15.1 25.3%
Radio and TV equipment 36.3 26.8 9.5 26.2%
Medical equipment and precision instruments 25.6 15.3 10.3 40.2%
Vehicles and accessories 178.1 162 16.2 9.1%
Other transport equipment 57.9 55.1 2.8 4.8%
Furniture and other manufacturing 126.3 102.7 23.6 18.7%




























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Fixed effects Fixed effects Fixed effects Fixed effects
1 2 3 4
Lagged Temp 0.0811*** 0.0796*** 0.0739*** 0.0733***
(0.0179) (0.0187) (0.0168) (0.0178)
Lagged Temp*Post ‐0.0283* ‐0.0261 ‐0.0293* ‐0.0277
(0.0169) (0.0181) (0.0158) (0.0172)
P‐value 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000
Observations 17679 17679 17312 17312
Within R‐squared 0.0130 0.0276 0.0163 0.0320




Table 7. Capital Structure and Temporary Contracts: Pre- and Post-Subsidies
Total Debt / Total Assets
Notes: This table reports the results of regressing leverage (defined as the ratio of total debt to assets) on the 
proportion of workers on temporary contracts (one year prior to the dependent variable) and its interaction with 
Post dummy variable (which is equal to 1 for years from 1997 onwards, and 0 otherwise). P-value reports the p-
value of the 2-sided test that the sum of the coefficients at Lagged Temp and Lagged Temp*Post is equal to 0. 
Standard errors are two-way clustered at the region*year and firm level and are reported below the coefficients. 
Firm control variables include size, tangibility, profitability, and R&D. The first year the firm appears in the sample 
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We use a proprietary dataset obtained from a fund of funds to study the risk premia 
associated with hedge fund transparency, liquidity, complexity, and concentration over the 
period from April 2006 to March 2009. We are able to directly measure these qualitative 
characteristics by using the internal grades that the fund of funds attached to all the funds it 
invested in, and that represent the unique information that cannot be obtained from quantitative 
data alone. Consistent with factor models of risk premium, we find that during the normal times 
low-transparency, low-liquidity, low-complexity, and high-concentration funds delivered a 
return premium, with economic magnitudes of 5% to 10% per year, while during bad states of 
the economy, these funds experienced significantly lower returns. We also offer a novel 
explanation for why highly concentrated funds command a risk premium by revealing that it is 
mostly prevalent among the non-transparent funds where investors are unaware about the exact 
risks they are facing and hence cannot diversify them away. 
 
Keywords: Hedge funds, Risk premia, Transparency, Liquidity, Complexity, 
Concentration. 
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1 Introduction
In the modern era of delegated portfolio management hedge funds constitute one of the most in-
teresting and the most complicated investment vehicles. Usually they operate in a way that does
not require them to disclose details about their operations. This does not mean that hedge funds
do not disclose this information, but that they are not obliged to do so and as a result the level of
disclosure is an internal decision by the hedge fund manager. The fund’s structure and disclosure
level is rarely modified after the fund’s initiation since the fund’s investors expect it to maintain
the same structure and disclosure level during its operation.
The question of whether hedge funds should be required to disclose the information regarding
their trades and positions is very important, especially in the light of the recent regulatory changes,
including the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform Act passed in July 2010, in particular. This act
requires managers of hedge funds with more than $150 million in assets under management to
register with the Securities and Exchange Commission and become subject to its disclosure rules.
Although the consequences of this act are yet to be evaluated, in this paper we attempt to explore
the connection between hedge fund reporting levels and their returns. The primary goal of this
paper is thus to determine whether there is a significant return premium associated with more
secretive, less transparent hedge funds.
The contribution of our paper is three-fold. First of all, by using a novel proprietary dataset
obtained from a fund of funds that spans April 2006 to March 2009, we are able to directly measure
the transparency level of a fund, a qualitative characteristic that is missing in public hedge fund
databases, and to use it to uncover and quantify the non-transparency risk premium which amounts
to 5.4% per year. Importantly, the use of the data that come from both good and bad states of
the economy allows us to directly test the risk-premium story against the alternative of better
managers being selected into managing low-transparency funds. Second, by investigating how
excess returns vary with other fund characteristics, such as fund liquidity, complexity of its strategy,
and concentration of its investments, we document the presence of several other risk premia in a
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cross-section of hedge fund returns. Finally, we explore how transparency, liquidity, complexity,
and concentration help explain the fund return volatility and capital inflows.
A few papers in the asset pricing literature have raised the issues of transparency as related
to hedge funds, presumably due to the absence of adequate data to explore this question. Anson
(2002) outlines different types of transparency and discusses why investors may want higher de-
gree of transparency; Hedges (2007) overviews the key issues of hedge fund investment from a
practitioners perspective; Goltz and Schroder (2010) survey hedge fund managers and investors on
their reporting practices and find that the quality of hedge fund reporting is considered to be an
important investment criterion. Aggarwal and Jorion (2012) study quantitatively effects of hedge
funds’ decisions on whether to provide or not to provide managed accounts to their investors. They
interpret the incidence of accepting managed accounts as an indicator of the willingness of the fund
to offer transparency and do not relate the results to risk premium. In contrast, we are able to di-
rectly measure the level of transparency of a fund by using proprietary fund of funds scores that
are based on formal and informal interactions with hedge funds, such as internal reports, meetings
with managers and phone calls. To the best of our knowledge, we are also the first paper to explore
and quantify the risk premium associated with low transparency.
To illustrate the risk-premium channel, let us consider a risk-averse investor who faces two
alternative hedge funds. If investment with one of them is considered to be more risky from the
point of view of investors, this fund will have to deliver superior returns during normal times in
order to attract any investment at all, i.e. investors are said to be compensated for bearing the risk.
At some point these risks will realize, and this is when the riskier fund underperforms.
To further relate this to transparency, notice that hedge funds that choose to provide less in-
formation about their positions and strategy details to investors leave them uncertain about the
underlying risks of investing with these hedge funds. In particular, when a transparent fund starts
to diverge from its declared strategy, investors can quickly disinvest if they dislike the turnaround,
while in the case of a non-transparent fund investors will only learn about the change in the fund
strategy later and have to face the consequences. This means that risk-averse investors should
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be compensated for bearing the risks associated with non-transparency. In particular, during the
normal times low-transparency hedge funds are expected to perform better than high-transparency
hedge funds by delivering an additional non-transparency risk premium. During the bad times,
on the other hand, the risks associated with non-transparency can realize, meaning that the low-
transparency funds will deliver lower returns as compared to high-transparency funds.
The time frame of our dataset that spans from April 2006 to March 2009 allows us to separately
study the return premia that realized during the good and bad states of the economy. In particular,
this period covers the collapse of large global investment banks – Bear Stearns and Lehman Broth-
ers, in March and September 2008, respectively. The overall fear of investors to get stuck with bad
uncontrolled investments could reasonably generate the demand for transparency. Therefore, it is
realistic to assume that non-transparency risks indeed realized during the later period of our data.
Indeed, our empirical results suggest that during the crisis period from April 2008 to March 2009
more transparent funds outperformed the less transparent funds by about 7.1% per year.
We also document the presence of hedge fund illiquidity risk premium. This is consistent with
a large literature on risk premia associated with illiquidity across a variety of asset classes.1 In
general, illiquidity premium is a premium for investment in more illiquid assets. For example,
when the investor faces two alternative assets with one being more liquid than the other, she is
able to disinvest from a more liquid asset with a lower loss when faced with a liquidity shock.
Therefore, risk-averse investors invest in less liquid assets only if they expect to get superior returns
from them. The most liquid funds in our dataset are the funds that both invest in higher liquidity
assets and have fewer restrictions with regard to investment withdrawal (such as the lockup period).
We estimate the illiquidity premium to be about 5.7% to 7.8% per year depending on the empirical
specification. Our paper is related to Liang (1999) and Aragon (2007) who show that funds with
longer lockup periods outperform other funds.
Given the richness of our dataset, we are also able to explore the risk premia associated with
1 See Amihud and Mendelson (1986) for the seminal contribution, as well as Pastor and Stambaugh (2003), and
Acharya and Pedersen (2005).
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more complicated strategies used by hedge funds, as well as with more concentrated investments.
We find that during normal times high-complexity hedge funds underperformed low-complexity
hedge funds by 3.9% per year in a specification controlling for other qualitative characteristics,
while the results for later period are mixed.
We also find some evidence of a concentration risk premium. It is interesting to note that
concentration of hedge fund investments should not matter in the light of the standard finance
theory theory due to the theoretical ability of investors to diversify away the non-systematic (id-
iosyncratic) risks. This is in contrast to a recent empirical study by Ang et al (2009) who find that
idiosyncratic volatility bears a significant premium. In our paper we are able to offer a novel expla-
nation of why investors may not be able to diversify their risks, by exploring among which funds
the concentration premium is mostly pronounced. Intuitively, hedge fund investors should be com-
pensated for the risks associated with concentrated investments of a fund when they do not know
what constitutes these investments, i.e. do not know which risks to diversify away. Hence, we
expect to see a concentration risk premium only among the non-transparent hedge funds. Indeed,
we verify this prediction using the interactions between concentration and transparency variables
in our empirical setup.
Our paper is close in spirit to Brown, Goetzmann, Liang, and Schwarz (2008) who use SEC
filing data to construct a so called ω−score, which is a combined measure of conflict of interests,
concentrated ownership, and leverage, and show that it is a significant predictor of the projected
fund life. In a subsequent paper, Brown, Goetzmann, Liang, and Schwarz (2012) use proprietary
due diligence data to construct an operational risk variable as a linear combination of variables
that correspond to mistakes in statements, internalized pricing, and presence of an auditor in the
Big 4 group. We consider operational risk in a broader sense, where the willingness of hedge
fund managers to provide details of their strategies, as well as hedge fund liquidity, investment
concentration, and the ability of the investors to understand fund’s operations are important.
We also study hedge fund return volatility and capital flows and find that the return volatil-
ity can be partially explained by the high degrees of hedge fund concentration and liquidity, with
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up to 37% of the explained variation in the full-sample specification. During each of the peri-
ods considered the difference between volatilities of high-concentration versus low-concentration
funds constitutes on average 2% per year, while the volatility of high-liquidity funds is on average
about 1% lower than the volatility of low-liquidity funds. Both these magnitudes are economically
significant given that the average hedge fund volatility over the sample is equal to 11% per year.
Finally, we also study how hedge fund capital flows are related to their transparency, liquid-
ity, complexity, and concentration and find that among our qualitative variables only the level of
liquidity can robustly explain capital flows across different periods in our sample. In particular,
we find that low-liquidity funds experienced heavier outflows, especially during the crisis period
from April 2008 to March 2009, where the difference between the flows from low-liquidity and
high-liquidity funds amounted to 26.6 percentage points.
Our paper is organized as follows: Section 2 describes the data and variables used in our study,
Section 3 explains the estimation procedure and the empirical setup, Section 4 discusses the main
results on the risk premia associated with transparency, liquidity, complexity, and concentration,
as well as additional results and robustness checks, and Section 5 concludes.
2 Data
We use a unique dataset obtained from a fund of funds that contains detailed fund-year information
over the 2007–2009 period. This fund of funds is one of the largest in the U.S. The data provide
information on hedge fund returns net of fees, their assets under management, and long and short
exposures. Most importantly, these data include scores for hedge fund transparency, liquidity,
complexity, and concentration as rated by the fund of funds on a scale from 1 to 4. Once a year at
the end of March the fund of funds grades all the hedge funds it invests in based on its interactions
with them during the previous twelve months. These interactions consist of weekly or monthly
reports to the fund of funds, meetings with managers, phone calls, etc. Due to the nature of the
scoring process and a significant level of effort put into the construction of the scores we feel
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confident that they represent unique information about funds’ operation that cannot be captured
by the quantitative data alone. Such qualitative measures are not present in public hedge fund
databases, such as CISDM, HFR, or TASS. Therefore, we think our data are especially well-suited
for studying the return premia associated with different qualitative characteristics of hedge funds.
The definitions of transparency, liquidity, complexity, and concentration as used by the fund of
funds are natural and intuitive. In particular, hedge fund transparency represents the willingness
of the hedge fund manager to share information about the fund’s current activities and investments
with its investors. Hedge fund liquidity measures the liquidity of investments with the hedge fund
from the point of view of investors. It comprises of both the liquidity of fund’s assets and restric-
tions on investment withdrawal, such as the presence and the length of lockup periods. Hedge fund
complexity corresponds to the complexity of hedge fund strategy and its operations. For example,
an offshore hedge fund that uses derivative instruments and swap agreements is considered to be
complicated, since it is very hard for investors to understand exactly the kinds of risks it faces by
investing with such fund. Finally, hedge fund concentration represents the level of concentration
of hedge fund investments.
After filtering out various versions of the funds we are left with 355 observations of 167 differ-
ent hedge funds that are evenly spread across the three years, with 121 observations in 2007, 122
– in 2008, and 112 – in 2009. Since our qualitative grades are given at the end of March, we use
2007, 2008, and 2009 to denote April 2006 to March 2007, April 2007 to March 2008, April 2008
to March 2009 periods, correspondingly. For example, the annualized return of a fund from April
2006 to March 2007 is matched to transparency, liquidity, complexity, and concentration grades
that the fund of funds issued at the end of March 2007. This approach ensures that all interactions
with the hedge fund that constitute the basis for the grades are conducted in the same period when
the fund return is delivered.
Our time frame is purposefully divided into three very distinct periods, since the risk premium
story which we attempt to illustrate should reveal different subsets of funds to perform better
during good versus bad states of the economy. According to the Financial Crisis Inquiry Report
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(2011), the period from April 2006 to March 2007 can be considered a normal growth year. The
beginning of the period from April 2007 to March 2008 also corresponds to a good state of the
economy, but the end of this period was already associated with a recession in US. The collapse of
Bear Stearns in March 2008 declared the beginning of the financial crisis, which makes us treat the
period from April 2007 to March 2008 as an intermediary period. Finally, the period from April
2008 to March 2009 was clearly a period corresponding to a bad state of the economy, highlighted
by the bankruptcy filing by Lehman Brothers, one of the largest investment banks. 2 Importantly,
the exogeneity of the global financial crisis allows us to provide more evidence towards the risk
premium explanation, since we are able to observe both the return premia during normal times as
well as manifestations of the corresponding risks during the crisis period.
Hedge funds in our dataset represent a broad set of strategies. In particular, there are credit
(CR), event-driven (ED), equity (EQ), relative-value (RV), and tactical trading (TT) hedge funds.
Credit hedge funds trade mostly corporate bonds and CDS on those bonds; event-driven hedge
funds seek to predict market moves based on specific news announcements; equity hedge funds
trade equities; relative value hedge funds seek pair trades where one asset is believed to outperform
another asset independent of macro events; and tactical trading funds seek to establish favorable
tactical positions using various combinations of the above strategies.
Each fund is identified by a single strategy. Moreover, this characteristic is time-invariant for
a given hedge fund (at least during the period considered). This is not surprising given that funds
are created in order to pursue a particular strategy and investors expect the fund to follow it con-
tinuously over time. Panel A of Table 1 tabulates the number of hedge funds by various strategies
for each of the periods considered. Approximately half of the hedge funds in the database are eq-
uity funds, with relative-value and event-driven as the next popular strategies. This distribution of
strategies across funds is comparable to other databases, as reported, for example, by Bali, Brown,
and Caglayan (2011) for TASS.
2 It is also worth mentioning, that according to NBER April 2006 to November 2007 was a growth period while
December 2007 to March 2009 was a recession period.
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Panel B of Table 1 reports the mean, standard deviation, 25-th, 50-th, and 75-th percentiles,
and the number of observations for hedge fund annualized returns, volatility, and assets under
management (AUM) separately for each of the periods considered. Hedge funds performed well
as a group during the normal period from April 2006 to March 2007 delivering on average a
13.59% per annum return with a 6.53% standard deviation. During the intermediate period they
delivered on average a 3.72% return with a higher 10.92% volatility, while during the crisis period
they delivered on average a negative –16.56% return with a 15.81% volatility.
The funds in our dataset are somewhat larger, than funds in CISDM, HFR, or TASS databases,
since we filter out copies of the same funds, that although legally constitute different hedge funds
are in fact just different versions of the same fund (and hence have same returns, as well as trans-
parency, liquidity, complexity, and concentration scores). An example of such situation would be
an onshore and an offshore versions of a fund (different for tax treatment) or versions denominated
in different currencies that have identical portfolios. Ang, Gorovyy, and van Inwegen (2011) use
the same data to explore hedge fund leverage and note that funds in the dataset are not subject to
selection bias. Therefore, we are confident that funds in our dataset are representative of the hedge
fund industry.
For each of the qualitative characteristics (transparency, liquidity, complexity, and concentra-
tion) we define their High, Medium, and Low levels. The fund of funds gives original grades in
such a way that a grade of 1 would represent the lowest level of problem with a particular char-
acteristic from the point of view of risk for an investor. In particular, funds with high levels of
transparency and liquidity and funds with low levels of complexity and concentration are rated
with a 1.
For consistency purposes and the ease of interpretation we define all the variables in such a way
that a High value represents a high level of the variable itself rather than a high level of problem
with that variable. Therefore, whenever we speak of high transparency or high complexity, for
example, we always mean a high level of transparency and a high level of complexity, respectively.
We define Medium and Low levels in a similar way. There is a very small percentage of funds that
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are ever rated with a 4, henceforth we combine the grades of 3 and 4 into one category in order to
ensure that we have a reasonable number of observations in each category.
Panel C of Table 1 reports the pairwise rank correlations between transparency, liquidity, com-
plexity, and concentration, computed using Kendall’s (1938) τB-method to account for the categor-
ical nature of the variables and ties, for each year. As can be seen from these results, the pairwise
correlations are quite robust over time. More transparent funds are also more liquid, with the cor-
relation statistically significant at 5% level for 2007 and at 10% level for 2008 and 2009. More
transparent and more liquid funds are also less complex on average. Finally, more liquid funds
are also less concentrated. These results document the interesting patterns in the cross-sectional
distribution of fund characteristics.
3 Empirical strategy
We study the hedge fund return premia associated with transparency, liquidity, complexity, and

































+ γX ′it + dt + it
where rit denotes the annual excess return of fund i in year t. α is a set of regression coeffi-
cients with respect to the corresponding indicator variables Dit, where the subscript refers to the
qualitative characteristic of the fund (transparency, liquidity, complexity, or concentration) and the
superscript refers to the level of that characteristic (High or Medium). For example, the indicator
variable DHTran,it is equal to 1 if fund i in year t has a high level of transparency, and 0 otherwise.
Similarly, the indicator variable DMCom,it is equal to 1 if fund i in year t has a medium level of
complexity, and 0 otherwise. In some specifications we also allow for a vector of controls X ′it
that includes the return volatility and the natural logarithm of fund’s assets under management, to
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account for a potential difference in performance of funds that have different level of volatility or
size.
Since risk premia for transparency, liquidity, complexity, and concentration can be different
for different years, we estimate the above relationship separately for each year. Furthermore, in
our full-sample results that cover all three years of data we include year fixed effects dt in order
to account for macroeconomic effects that are common to all hedge funds. Finally, it denotes the
error term in the above-specified regression model.
The low levels of our qualitative variables of interest are naturally omitted in the regression
specification. Funds with low levels of transparency, liquidity, complexity, and concentration serve
as the base category. α-coefficients can be interpreted as the corresponding risk premia with respect
to these groups of funds.
Although there is a panel component to our data, the qualitative characteristics of interest are
highly persistent within a fund. For example, among all the funds that have a transparency level
present for two years or more, 89% actually have the same level of transparency in all years. Simi-
larly, 91%, 94%, and 83% of funds have the same level of liquidity, complexity, and concentration,
respectively, in all years. The observation that the fund disclosure level and its structure in general
are rarely modified after the fund’s initiation is not surprising, because fund investors expect the
fund to maintain the same configuration over time. Given the high persistency of fund qualita-
tive characteristics, we do not attempt to estimate the within-fund return premia for transparency,
liquidity, complexity, and concentration, especially since we believe that the cross-sectional rela-
tionship in this case is more insightful.
We also include strategy fixed effects to allow for a differential performance of funds pursuing
different strategies in some regression specifications. Such specifications allow to explore how
fund returns vary with transparency, liquidity, complexity, and concentration across funds of the
same strategy or style. Finally, in all our specifications we report standard errors that are robust to
heteroskedasticity, as well as within-fund correlation over time in full-sample results.
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4 Results
4.1 Performance of hedge funds: univariate regression results
We start with univariate regressions of hedge fund performance on the indicator variables corre-
sponding to our qualitative characteristics in order to take the first look on the differences between
hedge funds that have different levels of transparency, liquidity, complexity, and concentration.
Table 2 reports the results of such specifications. We see that, consistent with our predictions from
Section 1, high-transparency hedge funds and medium-transparency hedge funds considerably un-
derperformed the low-transparency hedge funds during the normal time period from April 2006
to March 2007 (Panel A). This underperformance is statistically significant at the 1% significance
level. Moreover, the economic magnitude of this coefficient is large, suggesting for an average
difference in returns between low- and high-transparency hedge funds of 5.7% per year. At the
same time, medium-transparency hedge funds underperformed low-transparency hedge funds by
4.3% per year.
During the intermediate April 2007 to March 2008 period the difference in performance be-
comes less significant both economically and statistically. During the crisis period (April 2008
to March 2009), however, we see a clear reversal in the sign of the difference between high-
transparency and low-transparency hedge fund returns. According to the theory, if risks associated
with low-transparency funds are realized in this period, we should see the high-transparency funds
to be performing better during this period. Indeed, the high-transparency funds outperform the
low-transparency funds by the economically significant 7.1% per year. However, due to the high
volatility of returns during this period (as documented in Panel B of Table 1, the difference in per-
formance between high-transparency and low-transparency funds is not statistically different from
0, yielding a p-value of 14%.
Turning to our liquidity measure in Panel B, we observe that the difference in performance
between high- and low-liquidity hedge funds is even more pronounced than the difference in per-
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formance between high- and low-transparency hedge funds. Table 2 reports that during April 2006
to March 2007 period high-liquidity hedge funds underperformed low-liquidity hedge funds by
7.8% per year and medium-liquidity hedge funds underperformed them by 5.5% year with both
coefficients being highly economically and statistically significant. In the intermediate April 2007
to March 2008 period we observe that the signs of the coefficients get reversed with high-liquidity
hedge funds outperforming low-liquidity hedge funds by 8.2%. Finally, during the crisis period
we observe that high-liquidity hedge funds outperformed low liquidity hedge funds by an extraor-
dinary 28.2%, while medium-liquidity hedge funds outperfomed them by 13.3%. These results
are again both highly economically and statistically significant. Consistent with the illiquidity-risk
premium story, during the good period low-liquidity funds deliver higher return as a compensation
for the illiquidity risk premium, while during the bad period the risk manifests in the underperfor-
mance of these funds.
Interestingly, we do not find any evidence for the existence of a risk premium associated with
the complexity of the strategies employed by funds, at least in the univariate framework. The
results in Table 2 Panel C suggest that in all periods considered there is no statistical or economical
difference between returns of high-complexity and low-complexity funds, suggesting that the risk
premium associated with fund complexity is small if it exists at all.
We observe a similar to hedge fund transparency and liquidity picture with regard to hedge fund
concentration reported in Table 2 Panel D. During the normal April 2006 to March 2007 period
highly concentrated hedge funds outperform low-concentration funds by 7.4%, while medium-
concentration funds outperfom low-concentration hedge funds by 4.4%. During the April 2007
to March 2008 period we observe that the realized risk premium is close to zero and during the
crisis period of April 2008 to March 2009 we see a reversal with highly concentrated hedge funds
underperforming low-concentration hedge fudns by 12.3%. These results are consistent with the
existence of risk premium associated with more concentrated (less diversified) funds.
In the last column of each Panel we also consider regressions that include all three time peri-
ods and allow for a different average return in each year by including year fixed effects into this
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specification. We observe that the coefficients for transparency and concentration lose their signifi-
cance. This is not surprising in light of the risk premium story, since our three years both cover the
years of expansion and the years of recession. Low and insignificant coefficients for the qualitative
variables over time help to rule out the alternative story that would suggest that fund managers
with persistently better performance are all selected into managing low-transparency and/or high-
concentration funds. The exogenous variation introduced by the downturn of the economy in
2008-2009 enables us to observe the performance of funds in different states of the world, and to
provide a direct support for the risk premium story that is represented by funds earning a positive
premium during growth periods and negative premium during crisis periods when the embedded
risk manifests.
At the same time we observe that the difference in performance between high- and low-liquidity
funds is positive and significant, which seems to be driven by the very high difference in perfor-
mance between high-liquidity and low-liquidity hedge funds during the crisis period. Since the
recession years are less frequent than the growth periods, we expect the significance of liquidity
coefficient to drop if the time frame of the study were prolonged to include more years of data.
In light of the above results it is interesting to explore whether the documented risk premia still
exists if we take a more general approach allowing for all of our measures to influence returns at
the same time, as well as investigate whether our results are driven by other potential factors such
as fund return volatility, size or the strategy employed. This is the approach we take next.
4.2 Performance of hedge funds: multivariate regression results
Table 3 reports the results of multivariate regressions that use all of our qualitative variables at the
same time, as well as controls for hedge fund size, volatility and strategy. These results are very
similar to the results we obtained in univariate regressions. For example, during the normal April
2006 to March 2007 period high-transparency funds underperformed low-transparency funds by
5.4% per year, controlling for the level of other qualitative characteristics. At the same time, high-
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liquidity funds underperformed low-liquidity funds by 5.7% per year or 6.1% in the specification
which includes additional controls for size of the hedge fund, its return volatility and the strategy
employed.
It is especially important to control for all of our qualitative characteristics at the same time,
since many of them are correlated with each other, as reported in Panel C of Table 1. The results
in Table 3, however, suggest that each of the main variables of interest is important irrespective
of the values of other variables, and risk premium for low-transparency funds, for instance, is not
driven by illiquidity or concentration premia. These results are also robust to the inclusion of the
logarithm of assets under management (a proxy for the size of the hedge fund), return volatility,
and strategy fixed effects, suggesting that the observed risk premia are not driven by funds being
larger or more volatile, or by a potentially different performance of funds employing different
strategies3 .
Similarly to our univariate results, the regression coefficients are mostly insignificant during the
intermediate April 2007 to March 2008 period, while during the crisis period we observe a reversal
in the signs of the coefficients for high-transparency and high- and medium-liquidity funds, with
the latter two being statistically significant at the 1% level both in the specifications with and
without additional controls.
As compared to the univariate regression results we find some evidence of a low-complexity
risk premium. In particular we observe that high-complexity funds significantly underperformed
the low-complexity funds during the normal April 2006 to March 2007 period by about 3.7%-3.9%
per year depending on the specification. This suggests that the absence of evidence towards a low-
complexity risk premium in the univariate case (Panel C of Table 2) is likely driven by a negative
correlation of complexity with transparency and liquidity (as reported by Panel C of Table 1), given
3 Ideally, we would like to estimate a separate specification for each strategy to explore potential differences in
magnitudes of the risk premia across various strategies. However, the number of strategy-year observations is too
small to fit so many parameters, so we have to leave this intriguing question for future research. Instead, we estimate
a set of specifications where we drop one strategy at a time and find that the results are robust.
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that high levels of both command a return premium during normal times. It is therefore important
to look at all qualitative variables together in order to implicitly account for interrelations between
them. The results in Table 3 can thus be interpreted as the presence of risk premia associated with
low transparency, low liquidity, low complexity and high concentration, conditional on the level of
all qualitative characteristics as well as additional controls.
4.3 Robustness checks and volatility and flows results
The data sample consists of observations when the fund of funds actually chose to invest with
a given fund in a given year, so a potential concern for our results is that the fund of funds se-
lected a different subsample of funds every year and for this reason some high-transparent funds
underperformed some low-transparent funds in the normal period from April 2006 to March 2007
while other high-transparent funds outperformed other low-transparent funds in the crisis period
from April 2008 to March 2009. To explore further the issue of the selection and as a robustness
check, we also provide the results of estimating the same set of specifications in a balanced panel
in Table 4, where we require funds to be present during all three periods. This leaves us with 73
observations per year.
We note that the magnitudes of the risk premia associated with transparency and liquidity are
almost identical when we condition on the presence of the fund in all three periods. Furthermore,
the picture with regard to complexity and concentration risk premia becomes even more clear. In
particular, controlling for other qualitative characteristics, high-complexity funds underperformed
low-complexity funds by 5.2% per year during the normal April 2006 to March 2007 period. When
we additionally control for volatility, size of the fund, and strategy employed, this coefficient stays
highly statistically significant with a simillar economic magnitude of 4.6% per year. Interestingly,
high-concentration funds overperformed low-concentration funds by 10.5% per year, or 8.5% per
year when additional controls are taken into account. Taken together, the evidence in Table 4
suggests that our results are not driven by a different composition of funds from year to year, but
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rather by the same funds earning a risk premium during good times and facing a loss when a
negative economy shock realizes.
The results in Tables 2, 3 and 4 provide evidence for the presence of various risk premia, in
particular the one associated with high levels of concentration of hedge fund investments. The
standard finance theory, however, suggests that investors should be able to diversify away all non-
systematic (idiosyncratic) risk (see Markowitz, 1952, for the seminal paper). Therefore, such a
premium should exist only if investors’ diversification capabilities are limited.4 A recent empir-
ical investigation by Ang et al. (2009), indeed, shows that idiosyncratic stock volatility bears a
premium.
To the best of our knowledge the question of why investors do not fully diversify the risks
associated with holding a concentrated portfolio has not been explored in the context of hedge
funds. In this paper we provide an explanation for why investors demand a premium for investing
with concentrated funds that is unrelated to some market frictions or incomplete information. To
do that we explore the interaction between the hedge fund transparency and concentration. The
rationale behind such an investigation is that concentration should only command a premium when
hedge fund investors do not know hedge fund holdings and hence cannot diversify associated risks
away. On the other hand, when investors perfectly know what underlying assets the fund is trading,
even if the fund is concentrated, they can diversify the corresponding risks and hence should not
require a risk premium.
In terms of our empirical framework, this suggests that we should observe the concentration
risk premium mainly prevalent among low-transparency funds. To implement this intuition, we
regress fund excess returns on their qualitative characteristics (transparency, liquidity, complexity,
and concentration) by year, where we additionally introduce all pairwise interactions of the levels
of transparency and concentration. Indeed, the results in Table 5 suggest that it is exactly the
low-transparency high-concentration funds that command a return premium during normal times.
4 See, for example, Merton (1987).
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In particular, during the April 2006 to March 2007 period among the low-transparency funds,
high-concentration funds earned 11.7% more than the low-concentration ones, where this differ-
ence is significant at a 1% level. At the same time, among the high-transparency funds the re-
turn premium of high-concentration funds over the low-concentration funds constituted a mere
11.7%−9.6% = 2.1% per year, which is statistically indistinguishable from zero. The−9.6% dif-
ference between these two return premia thus has an interpretation of a difference-in-differences
estimate and is significant at a 1% level. Overall, the results of Table 5 corroborate our intuition
that investors are in fact able to diversify the risks associated with investing in funds that hold
concentrated asset portfolios as long as they know what these portfolios consist of.
In some of the previous specifications we have used our measure of volatility as a control
variable in order to rule out a potential explanation of less transparent, less liquid, less complex, or
more concentrated funds having lower idiosyncratic volatility and hence commanding a premium
in the spirit of Ang et al (2009). Nevertheless, we would also like to explore how our qualitative
variables of interest can help explain the volatility of hedge fund returns. This is what we do next.
Table 6 reports results of multivariate regressions of hedge fund return volatility on trans-
parency, liquidity, complexity, and concentration indicators, for each year as well as for all three
years of data controlling for an average level of volatility using year fixed effects in the last column.
We observe that some portion of volatility can be attributed to these qualitative variables, with up
to 37% of explained variation in the full-sample specification. The signs of the coefficients are
in general similar across years. The high-liquidity funds are generally less volatile, with a 0.9%
lower annualized volatility as compared to low-liquidity funds. This result is very intuitive since
higher levels of liquidity of fund holdings lead to smaller jumps in returns on a month-to-month
basis as compared to those of illiquid funds which can experience such jumps due to updates in
prices of their assets. This evidence is consistent with the one presented in Huberman and Halka
(2001) who document that more liquid stocks have a lower idiosyncratic volatility. As expected,
this effect is most pronounced during the crisis period from April 2008 to March 2009, given that
the overall propensity to experience sudden changes in asset prices is higher during this period.
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We also observe high-concentration hedge funds to be significantly more volatile than the low-
concentration funds, with a difference in annualized volatility of about 2% across different specifi-
cations. This is also an intuitive result since high-concentration funds diversify less and so similar
shocks to prices of individual asset lead to larger changes in returns of these funds as compared
to the low-concentration funds. This magnitude is economically significant given that the aver-
age hedge fund volatility over the sample is equal to 11% per year. Interestingly, we do not find
any difference in volatility of hedge fund returns between high-transparency and low-transparency
funds.
Finally, we also study how hedge fund capital flows are related to their transparency, liquidity,
complexity, and concentration by considering multivariate regressions of hedge fund flows on these
variables. Results of the regressions are reported in Table 7. We find that hedge fund flows are
in general very volatile and that among our qualitative variables only the level of liquidity can
robustly explain capital flows across different periods in our sample. In particular, we find that
high-liquidity funds experienced bigger inflows than low-liquidity funds, especially during the
crisis period from April 2008 to March 2009. Given that the actual values of these flows were
negative, we interpret this result as low-liquidity funds experiencing heavier outflows than high-
liquidity funds, with the difference of about 26.6 percentage points.
5 Conclusion
In this paper we use proprietary data obtained from a fund of funds to study the risk premia as-
sociated with hedge fund transparency, liquidity, complexity, and concentration. We are able to
contribute to the literature by directly measuring the transparency level of a fund, a qualitative
characteristic that is missing in public hedge fund databases, and to use it to quantify the non-
transparency risk premium which amounts to about 5.4% per year during growth periods. Impor-
tantly, the use of the data that come from both good and bad states of the economy allows us to
directly test the risk-premium story against the alternative of better managers being selected into
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managing low-transparency funds.
We also investigate how excess returns vary with other fund characteristics, such as fund liq-
uidity, complexity of its strategies, and concentration of its investments. We find a significant risk
premia associated with low-liquidity, low-complexity, and high-concentration funds, where the lat-
ter is mostly pronounced among non-transparent funds. This result can be interpreted as a novel
explanation for why investors cannot diversify away the non-systematic risks.
Finally, we explore how transparency, liquidity, complexity, and concentration help explain
the fund return volatility and capital inflows. In particular, the returns of funds with higher levels
of liquidity and lower levels of concentration are less volatile. This result is not surprising since
high concentration of illiquid investments can lead to significant jumps in the prices of hedge
fund portfolios. With regard to hedge fund capital flows we find that during the crisis period
low-liquidity funds experienced significantly heavier outflows than high-liquidity funds.
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Table 1: Summary Statistics of Data
Panel A: Number of funds by strategy
Strategy 2007 2008 2009
CR 11 13 10
ED 18 19 20
EQ 65 65 51
RV 20 20 25
TT 7 5 6
Total 121 122 112
Panel B: Hedge fund characteristics
Variable Year Mean Std q25 q50 q75 N
Return 2007 13.59% 8.62% 9.03% 13.32% 18.02% 121
2008 3.72% 14.52% -5.00% 2.61% 10.58% 122
2009 -16.56% 19.64% -28.30% -16.21% -5.32% 112
Volatility 2007 6.53% 4.34% 3.68% 5.89% 7.80% 121
2008 10.92% 6.70% 6.44% 9.04% 13.09% 122
2009 15.81% 10.06% 9.30% 12.67% 20.38% 112
AUM 2007 905m 1.67b 128m 364m 1.05b 121
2008 1.04b 1.86b 145m 399m 1.28b 122
2009 810m 1.47b 121m 249m 1.03b 112
Panel C: Pairwise rank correlations of qualitative variables by year
Year Transparency Liquidity Complexity Concentration
2007 Transparency 1.000
Liquidity 0.187∗∗ 1.000
Complexity −0.144∗ −0.155∗ 1.000
Concentration −0.025 −0.175∗∗ 0.090 1.000
2008 Transparency 1.000
Liquidity 0.159∗ 1.000
Complexity −0.335∗∗∗ −0.159∗ 1.000
Concentration 0.071 −0.140∗ −0.135 1.000
2009 Transparency 1.000
Liquidity 0.147∗ 1.000
Complexity −0.269∗∗∗ −0.241∗∗∗ 1.000
Concentration 0.073 −0.193∗∗ −0.269∗∗∗ 1.000
This table reports various descriptive statistics of our data. Panel A reports the number of funds in our sample by
strategy by year. CR denotes credit hedge funds, ED – event-driven hedge funds, EQ – equity hedge funds, RV –
relative-value hedge funds, and TT – tactical-trading hedge funds. 2007 stands for April 2006 to March 2007, 2008
– for April 2007 to March 2008, and 2009 – for April 2008 to March 2009. Panel B reports the summary statistics
of hedge fund returns, volatility, and assets under management (AUM) for each of the time periods. Mean denotes
the annualized sample average, Std denotes the annualized sample standard deviation, q25, q50, and q75 denote the
25-th, 50th, and the 75th quantiles, respectively. Finally, N denotes the number of observations. Panel C reports the
pairwise rank correlations between transparency, liquidity, complexity, and concentration, computed using Kendall’s
(1938) τB-method to account for the categorical type of the variables and ties. *, **, and *** indicate significance at
the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels correspondingly.
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Table 2: Hedge fund performance: Univariate regression results
Panel A: Transparency
Variable Level APR06-MAR07 APR07-MAR08 APR08-MAR09 APR06-MAR09
Transparency High −0.057∗∗∗ −0.039 0.071 −0.015
(0.020) (0.046) (0.048) (0.024)
Medium −0.043∗∗ −0.029 −0.008 −0.024
(0.018) (0.035) (0.043) (0.022)
Observations 121 122 112 355
Adjusted R2 0.042 0.007 0.018 0.352
Panel B: Liquidity
Variable Level APR06-MAR07 APR07-MAR08 APR08-MAR09 APR06-MAR09
Liquidity High −0.078∗∗∗ 0.082∗ 0.282∗∗∗ 0.105∗∗∗
(0.017) (0.042) (0.034) (0.022)
Medium −0.055∗∗∗ 0.045 0.133∗∗∗ 0.048∗∗
(0.018) (0.032) (0.035) (0.019)
Observations 121 122 112 355
Adjusted R2 0.103 0.036 0.251 0.385
Panel C: Complexity
Variable Level APR06-MAR07 APR07-MAR08 APR08-MAR09 APR06-MAR09
Complexity High −0.010 0.020 0.031 0.014
(0.016) (0.045) (0.050) (0.026)
Medium 0.023 0.023 −0.027 0.004
(0.017) (0.027) (0.043) (0.020)
Observations 121 122 112 355




Variable Level APR06-MAR07 APR07-MAR08 APR08-MAR09 APR06-MAR09
Concentration High 0.074∗ 0.008 −0.122∗∗ −0.020
(0.041) (0.037) (0.053) (0.029)
Medium 0.044∗∗∗ −0.008 −0.035 0.005
(0.013) (0.026) (0.038) (0.016)
Observations 121 122 112 355
Adjusted R2 0.105 0.002 0.059 0.352
This table reports the results of linear univariate regressions of annual hedge fund excess returns on indicator variables
representing different fund characteristics, as described in Sections 2 and 3, separately for each time period considered
(April 2006 to March 2007, April 2007 to March 2008, and April 2008 to March 2009), as well as for all three
years, where the year fixed effects are included. Panel A, B, C, and D report the results for transparency, liquidity,
complexity, and concentration, respectively. The base category are the funds with low levels of transparency, liquidity,
complexity, and concentration, so that the obtained slope coefficients can be interpreted as the corresponding return
premia earned by high- and medium-level funds with respect to the low-level groups of funds. Standard errors, robust
to heteroskedasticity, as well as to within-fund correlation in full-sample results, are reported in brackets. *, **, and













































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 5: Hedge fund performance: Transparency and concentration interaction results
Variable Level APR06-MAR07 APR07-MAR08 APR08-MAR09 APR06-MAR09
Transparency High −0.043∗ 0.093 0.078 0.021
(0.023) (0.074) (0.061) (0.035)
Medium −0.040∗ 0.094 −0.007 0.008
(0.023) (0.074) (0.059) (0.035)
Liquidity High −0.059∗∗∗ 0.131∗∗∗ 0.284∗∗∗ 0.124∗∗∗
(0.018) (0.050) (0.041) (0.025)
Medium −0.051∗∗∗ 0.083∗∗ 0.161∗∗∗ 0.067∗∗∗
(0.019) (0.042) (0.039) (0.023)
Complexity High −0.034∗∗ 0.065 0.069 0.030
(0.016) (0.055) (0.048) (0.026)
Medium 0.002 0.060∗ 0.030 0.024
(0.022) (0.034) (0.048) (0.024)
Concentration High 0.117∗∗∗ 0.277∗∗∗ −0.035 0.085∗
(0.024) (0.081) (0.031) (0.050)
Medium 0.025 0.145∗ 0.013 0.065∗
(0.033) (0.082) (0.061) (0.038)
Interactions High&High −0.096∗∗∗ −0.268∗∗∗ 0.024 −0.078
(0.033) (0.125) (0.072) (0.061)
High&Med 0.005 −0.217∗∗ −0.083 −0.096∗
(0.048) (0.108) (0.090) (0.050)
Med&High −0.062 −0.273∗∗∗ −0.016 −0.091
(0.074) (0.096) (0.094) (0.065)
Med&Med 0.018 −0.156∗ −0.036 −0.051
(0.036) (0.093) (0.072) (0.043)
Observations 121 122 112 355
Adjusted R2 0.237 0.119 0.305 0.400
This table reports the results of linear multivariate regressions of annual hedge fund excess returns on indicator vari-
ables representing different fund characteristics, as described in Sections 2 and 3, separately for each time period
considered (April 2006 to March 2007, April 2007 to March 2008, and April 2008 to March 2009), as well as for all
three years, where the year fixed effects are included. Additionally the regressions include the interactions between
transparency and concentration variables. The first level in the interaction terms notation represents the level of trans-
parency, while the last one corresponds to the level of concentration. For example, High&Med is a dummy variable
that is equal to 1 if a fund has a high level of transparency and a medium level of concentration. The base category
are the funds with low levels of transparency, liquidity, complexity, and concentration, so that the obtained slope co-
efficients can be interpreted as the corresponding return premia earned by high- and medium-level funds with respect
to the low-level groups of funds. Standard errors, robust to heteroskedasticity, as well as to within-fund correlation
in full-sample results, are reported in brackets. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels
correspondingly.
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Table 6: Hedge fund return volatility: Multivariate regression results
Variable Level APR06-MAR07 APR07-MAR08 APR08-MAR09 APR06-MAR09
Transparency High 0.0041 0.0035 −0.0046 0.0026
(0.0036) (0.0062) (0.0063) (0.0036)
Medium 0.0026 −0.0002 0.0064 0.0035
(0.0026) (0.0042) (0.0044) (0.0024)
Liquidity High 0.0029 −0.0131∗∗ −0.0165∗∗∗ −0.0090∗∗∗
(0.0041) (0.0061) (0.0049) (0.0036)
Medium 0.0010 −0.0112∗∗ −0.0027 −0.0043
(0.0030) (0.0051) (0.0060) (0.0033)
Complexity High −0.0037 −0.0046 0.0008 −0.0024
(0.0035) (0.0046) (0.0050) (0.0028)
Medium −0.0093∗∗∗ −0.0116∗∗∗ −0.0042 −0.0076∗∗
(0.0027) (0.0035) (0.0072) (0.0032)
Concentration High 0.0225∗∗∗ 0.0177∗∗∗ 0.0223∗∗ 0.0205∗∗∗
(0.0046) (0.0045) (0.0095) (0.0042)
Medium 0.0049∗∗∗ −0.0002 −0.0020 0.0012
(0.0020) (0.0033) (0.0047) (0.0021)
Observations 121 122 112 355
Adjusted R2 0.342 0.298 0.213 0.373
This table reports the results of linear multivariate regressions of annual hedge fund return volatilities on indicator
variables representing different fund characteristics, as described in Sections 2 and 3, separately for each time period
considered (April 2006 to March 2007, April 2007 to March 2008, and April 2008 to March 2009), as well as for all
three years, where the year fixed effects are included. The base category are the funds with low levels of transparency,
liquidity, complexity, and concentration, so that the obtained slope coefficients can be interpreted as the corresponding
volatility difference between high- and medium-level funds as compared to the low-level groups of funds. Standard
errors, robust to heteroskedasticity, as well as to within-fund correlation in full-sample results, are reported in brackets.
*, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels correspondingly.
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Table 7: Hedge fund inflows: Multivariate regression results
Variable Level APR06-MAR07 APR07-MAR08 APR08-MAR09 APR06-MAR09
Transparency High 0.222 0.453 −0.031 0.205
(0.237) (0.420) (0.077) (0.173)
Medium 0.096 0.100 −0.070 0.046
(0.157) (0.230) (0.058) (0.095)
Liquidity High 0.157 0.240 0.266∗∗∗ 0.224
(0.370) (0.392) (0.092) (0.197)
Medium −0.265∗ −0.067 0.155∗∗ −0.056
(0.152) (0.211) (0.062) (0.093)
Complexity High 0.283∗ 0.297 0.120 0.235∗
(0.168) (0.361) (0.077) (0.140)
Medium −0.061 0.265 0.156∗∗ 0.139
(0.174) (0.175) (0.069) (0.085)
Concentration High 0.233 −0.026 0.091 0.087
(0.201) (0.194) (0.068) (0.098)
Medium 0.280∗ 0.062 0.045 0.141
(0.163) (0.197) (0.063) (0.094)
Observations 109 107 95 311
Adjusted R2 0.133 0.055 0.123 0.189
This table reports the results of linear multivariate regressions of annual hedge fund inflows (measured as a percentage
of past assets under management) on indicator variables representing different fund characteristics, as described in
Sections 2 and 3, separately for each time period considered (April 2006 to March 2007, April 2007 to March 2008,
and April 2008 to March 2009), as well as for all three years, where the year fixed effects are included. The base
category are the funds with low levels of transparency, liquidity, complexity, and concentration, so that the obtained
slope coefficients can be interpreted as the corresponding volatility difference between high- and medium-level funds
as compared to the low-level groups of funds. Standard errors, robust to heteroskedasticity, as well as to within-fund
correlation in full-sample results, are reported in brackets. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and
1% levels correspondingly.
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